Memorydetective MCP Server
memorydetective
npm
v1.18.2
Published by carloshpdoc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for iOS leak hunting and performance investigation. 42 tools across .memgraph, .trace, and .mxdiagnostic files. v1.18 adds analyzeMetricKitPayload (42nd tool, post-mortem production-diagnostics from MetricKit JSON payloads — crash clusters, han
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/runtime/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; /** * Run a command and collect stdout/stderr. Does not throw on non-zero exit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runtime/exec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/runtime/sourcekit/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/sourcekit/client.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { resolve as resolvePath } from "node:path"; import { pathToFileURL } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runtime/sourcekit/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/detectLeaksInXCTest.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/detectLeaksInXCTest.js:205`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const child = spawn("xcodebuild", testArgs); let testStdout = ""; l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/detectLeaksInXCTest.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/detectLeaksInXCUITest.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/detectLeaksInXCUITest.js:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const child = spawn("xcodebuild", testArgs); let testStdout = ""; l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/detectLeaksInXCUITest.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/logShow.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/logShow.js:182`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const child = spawn("log"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/logShow.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/recordTimeProfile.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/recordTimeProfile.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { resolve as resolvePath, dirname, isAbsolute as isAbsolutePath, join as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/recordTimeProfile.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/recordViaInstrumentsApp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/recordViaInstrumentsApp.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { runCommand } from "../runtime/exec.js"; import { getSecurityFlags } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/recordViaInstrumentsApp.js
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyzeAbandonedMemoryno sensitive capabilityanalyzeAllocationsno sensitive capabilityanalyzeAnimationHitchesno sensitive capabilityanalyzeAppLaunchno sensitive capabilityanalyzeEnergyImpactno sensitive capabilityanalyzeHangsno sensitive capabilityanalyzeLeakTimelineno sensitive capabilityanalyzeMemgraphno sensitive capabilityanalyzeMemoryFootprintno sensitive capabilityanalyzeMetricKitPayloadno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
analyzeNetworkActivityno sensitive capabilityanalyzeTimeProfileno sensitive capabilitybootAndLaunchForLeakInvestigationno sensitive capabilitycaptureMemgraphno sensitive capabilitycaptureScenarioStateno sensitive capabilityclassifyCycleno sensitive capabilitycleanupTracesno sensitive capabilitycompareTracesByPatternno sensitive capabilitycountAliveno sensitive capabilitydetectLeaksInXCTestno sensitive capabilitydetectLeaksInXCUITestno sensitive capabilitydiffMemgraphsno sensitive capabilityfindCyclesno sensitive capabilityfindRetainersno sensitive capabilitygetInvestigationPlaybookno sensitive capabilityinspectTraceno sensitive capabilitylistTraceDevicesno sensitive capabilitylistTraceTemplatesno sensitive capabilitylogShowno sensitive capabilitylogStreamno sensitive capabilityreachableFromCycleno sensitive capabilityrecordTimeProfileno sensitive capabilityrecordViaInstrumentsAppno sensitive capabilityrenderCycleGraphno sensitive capabilityreplayScenariono sensitive capabilitysummarizeTraceno sensitive capabilityswiftFindSymbolReferencesno sensitive capabilityswiftGetHoverInfono sensitive capabilityswiftGetSymbolDefinitionno sensitive capabilityswiftGetSymbolsOverviewno sensitive capabilityswiftSearchPatternno sensitive capabilityverifyFixno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.18.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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