Memora (PyPI) MCP Server
memora-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP-compatible memory server backed by SQLite
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (memora/backends.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`memora/backends.py:76`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: AWS credentials file: ~/.aws/credentials\n" " - For Cloudflare R2: Set AWS_ENDPOINT_URL to your R2 endpoin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memora/backends.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (memora/server.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`memora/server.py:2814`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ssh", ".gnupg", ".aws", ".config/gcloud", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", ".env"] path_str = str(resolved).lower() for p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memora/server.py
medium Tool "memory_unlink" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "memory_unlink" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool memory_unlink
low Mutating tool "memory_unlink" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "memory_unlink" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool memory_unlink
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (memora-graph/scripts/sync-to-d1.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`memora-graph/scripts/sync-to-d1.py:268`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ectory result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=SCRIPT_DIR.parent, capture_output=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memora-graph/scripts/sync-to-d1.py
Tools 43
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memory_create_issuenetwork egressmemory_unlinkwrites filesmemory_absorbno sensitive capabilitymemory_backfill_tagsno sensitive capabilitymemory_boostno sensitive capabilitymemory_clustersno sensitive capabilitymemory_createno sensitive capabilitymemory_create_batchno sensitive capabilitymemory_create_sectionno sensitive capabilitymemory_create_todono sensitive capability
Show 33 more tools ↓
memory_deleteno sensitive capabilitymemory_delete_batchno sensitive capabilitymemory_delete_documentno sensitive capabilitymemory_detect_supersessionsno sensitive capabilitymemory_digestno sensitive capabilitymemory_events_clearno sensitive capabilitymemory_events_pollno sensitive capabilitymemory_exportno sensitive capabilitymemory_export_graphno sensitive capabilitymemory_find_duplicatesno sensitive capabilitymemory_getno sensitive capabilitymemory_get_documentno sensitive capabilitymemory_hierarchyno sensitive capabilitymemory_hybrid_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_importno sensitive capabilitymemory_insightsno sensitive capabilitymemory_linkno sensitive capabilitymemory_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_compactno sensitive capabilitymemory_mergeno sensitive capabilitymemory_migrate_imagesno sensitive capabilitymemory_rebuild_crossrefsno sensitive capabilitymemory_rebuild_embeddingsno sensitive capabilitymemory_relatedno sensitive capabilitymemory_semantic_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_statsno sensitive capabilitymemory_store_documentno sensitive capabilitymemory_tag_hierarchyno sensitive capabilitymemory_tagsno sensitive capabilitymemory_updateno sensitive capabilitymemory_upload_imageno sensitive capabilitymemory_validate_tagsno sensitive capabilitymemory_verify_integrityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (43 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.3.2 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.2.22 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan memora-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Memora 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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