Memento — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "memento-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "memento-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "memento-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (74 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (memento/active_coercion_hook.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memento/active_coercion_hook.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memento/active_coercion_hook.py"
},
"evidence": "return 0 paths = subprocess.check_output( [\"git\", \"diff\", \"--cached\", \"--name-only\", \"--diff-filter=ACMR\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "memento/active_coercion_hook.py",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (memento/git_context.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memento/git_context.py:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memento/git_context.py"
},
"evidence": "dProcess.\"\"\" return subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [\"git\", *args], capture_output=True, text=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "memento/git_context.py",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (memento/git_ingestion.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memento/git_ingestion.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memento/git_ingestion.py"
},
"evidence": "r: try: r = subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, cwd=cwd",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "memento/git_ingestion.py",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (memento/tools/coercion.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memento/tools/coercion.py:113`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memento/tools/coercion.py"
},
"evidence": "\"message\": \"exec() is a security risk and makes code hard to analyze.\", \"severity\": \"block\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "memento/tools/coercion.py",
"line": 113,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (memento/updater.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memento/updater.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memento/updater.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "memento/updater.py",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/run_benchmarks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/run_benchmarks.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/run_benchmarks.py"
},
"evidence": "--tb=short\"] return subprocess.call(cmd, cwd=root) if __name__ == \"__main__\": raise SystemExit(main())",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/run_benchmarks.py",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_active_coercion.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_active_coercion.py:135`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_active_coercion.py"
},
"evidence": "epo_root) blocked = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"memento.active_coercion_hook\"], cwd=repo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_active_coercion.py",
"line": 135,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_active_coercion_hook.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_active_coercion_hook.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_active_coercion_hook.py"
},
"evidence": "]}}, f) os.system(f\"cd {repo} && git init && git add . && git commit -m 'init'\") bad_file =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_active_coercion_hook.py",
"line": 32,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_tool_contracts.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_tool_contracts.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_mcp_tool_contracts.py"
},
"evidence": "ws = tmp_path subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"init\"], cwd=str(ws), check=False, stdou",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_mcp_tool_contracts.py",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tools_smoke.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tools_smoke.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_tools_smoke.py"
},
"evidence": "ws = tmp_path subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"init\"], cwd=str(ws), check=False,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_tools_smoke.py",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"memento-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "memento-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "memento_set_autonomy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_autonomy_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_autonomy_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_active_coercion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_install_git_hooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_list_active_coercion_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_list_active_coercion_presets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_apply_active_coercion_preset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_add_active_coercion_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_remove_active_coercion_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_configure_enforcement",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_precognition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_synthesize_dreams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_check_goal_alignment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_compact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_consolidate_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_consolidation_scheduler",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_superpowers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_warnings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_generate_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_dependency_tracker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_audit_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_share_memory_to_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_cross_workspace_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_explain_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_set_goals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_list_goals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_extract_kg",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_toggle_kg_extraction_scheduler",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_add_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_search_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_migrate_workspace_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_configure_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_pending_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_dismiss_notification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_warm_predictive_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_predictive_cache_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_pmg_add_entity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_pmg_add_relation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_pmg_entity_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_pmg_what_might_break",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_pmg_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_set_project_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_project_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_delete_project_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_project_state_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_system_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_memory_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_kg_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_quality_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_record_quality_evaluation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_get_relevance_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_record_memory_hit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_begin_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_resume_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_list_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_session_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_remember",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_configure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_cognitive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_coercion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_kg",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_search_vnext",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memento_explain_retrieval",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8787189c52bcf09dd733c5d2d625f0469c0c1b917033b810bdea7ff3089930cb",
"stats": {
"tools": 74,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 5,
"info": 1
}
}
}