Memem MCP Server
memem
PyPI
v2.9.7
Published by tt-wang — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 41.4 = 59. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −33 | Hardcoded GitHub token in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 59 − your exposure = 48. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (none) — trust in the source of the package |
| 0 | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Grade capped: 2 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (memem/security.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`memem/security.py:24`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .netrc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/security.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/test_security.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_security.py:29`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_security.py
high Hardcoded GitHub token in server code (tests/test_eval_replay.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking GitHub token is hardcoded in `tests/test_eval_replay.py:58`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: GitHub token: ghp_…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_eval_replay.py
high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/test_v010_fixes.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/test_v010_fixes.py:190`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_v010_fixes.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/capabilities.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/capabilities.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/capabilities.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/cli.py:452`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/dreamer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/dreamer.py:432`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/dreamer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/migrate_layers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/migrate_layers.py:168`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/migrate_layers.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/mine_delta.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/mine_delta.py:584`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/mine_delta.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/mining.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/mining.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/mining.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/playbook.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/playbook.py:137`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/playbook.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memem/profiles.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memem/profiles.py:355`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/profiles.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_bootstrap.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_bootstrap.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bootstrap.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_obsidian_store.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_obsidian_store.py:330`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_obsidian_store.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (tests/test_operations.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`tests/test_operations.py:40`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import (dedup)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_operations.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (memem/obsidian_store.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`memem/obsidian_store.py:216`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pickle.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memem/obsidian_store.py
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"memem" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package memem
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.9.7 latest |
F 59/100 | 17 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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