Melchizedek MCP Server

melchizedek npm v1.0.2 Source verified

Published by louis49 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust grade
B
88/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 88/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Minimal
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 11.7 = 88/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−11.7 Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 injection

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 4

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/embed-worker.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/embed-worker.js:118`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "${

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/embed-worker.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/hooks/pre-compact.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/hooks/pre-compact.js:108`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "${

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/hooks/pre-compact.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/hooks/session-end.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/hooks/session-end.js:104`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "${

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/hooks/session-end.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/hooks/session-start.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/hooks/session-start.js:101`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "${

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/hooks/session-start.js

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.2 latest B 88/100 4 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 88/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan melchizedek --online

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