Meilisearch (PyPI) MCP Server
meilisearch-mcp
PyPI
v0.7.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Meilisearch
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_docker_integration.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_docker_integration.py:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_docker_integration.py
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add-documentsno sensitive capabilitycancel-tasksno sensitive capabilitycreate-chat-completionno sensitive capabilitycreate-indexno sensitive capabilitycreate-keyno sensitive capabilitydelete-indexno sensitive capabilitydelete-keyno sensitive capabilityget-chat-workspace-settingsno sensitive capabilityget-chat-workspacesno sensitive capabilityget-connection-settingsno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
get-documentsno sensitive capabilityget-health-statusno sensitive capabilityget-index-metricsno sensitive capabilityget-keysno sensitive capabilityget-settingsno sensitive capabilityget-statsno sensitive capabilityget-system-infono sensitive capabilityget-taskno sensitive capabilityget-tasksno sensitive capabilityget-versionno sensitive capabilityhealth-checkno sensitive capabilitylist-indexesno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityupdate-chat-workspace-settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate-connection-settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate-settingsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.0 latest |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.6.0 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan meilisearch-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Meilisearch 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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