Meganova MCP Server
meganova-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([mesh_cost_summary]) and tools that can send data out ([mesh_eval_run, mesh_eval_history, mesh_eval_opt]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [mesh_cost_summary] → sinks [mesh_eval_run, mesh_eval_history, mesh_eval_opt]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow mesh_cost_summary → mesh_eval_run
high Tool "mesh_eval_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "mesh_eval_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool mesh_eval_run
high Tool "mesh_eval_history" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "mesh_eval_history" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool mesh_eval_history
high Tool "mesh_eval_opt" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "mesh_eval_opt" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool mesh_eval_opt
low Mutating tool "mesh_eval_run" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "mesh_eval_run" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool mesh_eval_run
low Mutating tool "mesh_eval_history" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "mesh_eval_history" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool mesh_eval_history
low Mutating tool "mesh_eval_opt" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "mesh_eval_opt" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool mesh_eval_opt
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mesh_cost_summaryreads sensitive datamesh_eval_historyruns code / shellmesh_eval_optruns code / shellmesh_eval_runruns code / shellchat_completionno sensitive capabilitycloud_agent_chatno sensitive capabilitycloud_agent_confirm_toolno sensitive capabilitycloud_agent_infono sensitive capabilitycreate_embeddingsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
generate_videono sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitymesh_agent_checkpointno sensitive capabilitymesh_agent_memoryno sensitive capabilitymesh_agent_sessionsno sensitive capabilitymesh_agent_think_logno sensitive capabilitymesh_agent_toolsno sensitive capabilitymesh_call_logno sensitive capabilitymesh_call_summaryno sensitive capabilitymesh_chatno sensitive capabilitymesh_clear_agent_memoryno sensitive capabilitymesh_delegate_taskno sensitive capabilitymesh_delegation_statusno sensitive capabilitymesh_delete_agentno sensitive capabilitymesh_get_agentno sensitive capabilitymesh_graphno sensitive capabilitymesh_harnessno sensitive capabilitymesh_healthno sensitive capabilitymesh_list_agentsno sensitive capabilitymesh_list_presetsno sensitive capabilitymesh_list_skillsno sensitive capabilitymesh_metricsno sensitive capabilitymesh_register_agentno sensitive capabilitymesh_reload_skillno sensitive capabilitymesh_request_journeyno sensitive capabilitymesh_restore_sessionno sensitive capabilitymesh_routeno sensitive capabilitymesh_route_and_executeno sensitive capabilitymesh_route_feedbackno sensitive capabilitymesh_save_sessionno sensitive capabilitymesh_search_catalogno sensitive capabilitymesh_sync_catalogno sensitive capabilitymesh_tracesno sensitive capabilitymesh_update_agentno sensitive capabilityrerank_documentsno sensitive capabilitytranscribe_audiono sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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