Mediawiki (ttpears) MCP Server

mediawiki-mcp npm v2.5.0 Source verified

Published by ttpears — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MediaWiki MCP server with multi-wiki support and REST API

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get-file → get-category-members → upload-file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow get-file → get-category-members → upload-file

Tools 21

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get-category-membersreads sensitive data
  • get-fileingests untrusted input
  • get-pageingests untrusted input
  • get-page-historyingests untrusted input
  • get-page-linksingests untrusted input
  • list-categoriesreads sensitive data
  • upload-filenetwork egress
  • upload-file-from-urlnetwork egress
  • add-wikino sensitive capability
  • create-pageno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
  • delete-pageno sensitive capability
  • find-pageno sensitive capability
  • get-recent-changesno sensitive capability
  • get-revisionno sensitive capability
  • list-wikisno sensitive capability
  • remove-wikino sensitive capability
  • search-pageno sensitive capability
  • search-page-by-prefixno sensitive capability
  • set-wikino sensitive capability
  • undelete-pageno sensitive capability
  • update-pageno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 3

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.5.0 latest A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v2.4.0 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25
v2.3.2 A 94/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-13

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mediawiki-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Mediawiki 3

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →

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