Mediagraph MCP Server

@mediagraph/mcp npm v1.0.16

Published by @mediagraph — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Mediagraph - Media Asset Management Platform

Trust grade
B
89/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 89/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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B Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 89/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: bulk_download_assets → create_search_query ⇒ create_comment. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow bulk_download_assets → create_search_query → create_comment

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import { platform } from "os"; import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, existsSyn

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "include_download_url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "include_download_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.include_download_url

Tools 129

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • bulk_download_assetsingests untrusted input
  • create_commentnetwork egress
  • create_downloadingests untrusted input
  • create_search_queryreads sensitive data
  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • get_asset_downloadingests untrusted input
  • get_downloadingests untrusted input
  • search_assets_visualingests untrusted input
  • update_search_queryreads sensitive data
Show 119 more tools ↓
  • upload_filenetwork egress
  • upload_filesnetwork egress
  • add_asset_to_collectionno sensitive capability
  • add_asset_to_lightboxno sensitive capability
  • add_assets_to_groupno sensitive capability
  • add_assets_to_uploadno sensitive capability
  • add_tags_to_assetno sensitive capability
  • approve_workflow_stepno sensitive capability
  • bulk_find_auto_tagsno sensitive capability
  • can_uploadno sensitive capability
  • cancel_bulk_jobno sensitive capability
  • create_bulk_jobno sensitive capability
  • create_collectionno sensitive capability
  • create_creator_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_crop_presetno sensitive capability
  • create_custom_meta_fieldno sensitive capability
  • create_filter_groupno sensitive capability
  • create_inviteno sensitive capability
  • create_lightboxno sensitive capability
  • create_personal_access_tokenno sensitive capability
  • create_rights_packageno sensitive capability
  • create_share_linkno sensitive capability
  • create_storage_folderno sensitive capability
  • create_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_taxonomyno sensitive capability
  • create_taxonomy_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_user_groupno sensitive capability
  • delete_assetno sensitive capability
  • delete_auto_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_collectionno sensitive capability
  • delete_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_filter_groupno sensitive capability
  • delete_lightboxno sensitive capability
  • delete_personal_access_tokenno sensitive capability
  • delete_search_queryno sensitive capability
  • delete_share_linkno sensitive capability
  • delete_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_taggingno sensitive capability
  • get_access_requestno sensitive capability
  • get_assetno sensitive capability
  • get_asset_auto_tagsno sensitive capability
  • get_asset_countsno sensitive capability
  • get_asset_face_taggingsno sensitive capability
  • get_asset_versionsno sensitive capability
  • get_auto_tagno sensitive capability
  • get_bulk_jobno sensitive capability
  • get_bulk_job_queue_positionno sensitive capability
  • get_collectionno sensitive capability
  • get_collections_treeno sensitive capability
  • get_contributionno sensitive capability
  • get_custom_meta_fieldno sensitive capability
  • get_filter_groupno sensitive capability
  • get_lightboxno sensitive capability
  • get_lightboxes_treeno sensitive capability
  • get_membershipno sensitive capability
  • get_meta_importno sensitive capability
  • get_notification_countno sensitive capability
  • get_organizationno sensitive capability
  • get_popular_assetsno sensitive capability
  • get_rights_packageno sensitive capability
  • get_search_queryno sensitive capability
  • get_share_linkno sensitive capability
  • get_storage_folderno sensitive capability
  • get_storage_folders_treeno sensitive capability
  • get_tagno sensitive capability
  • get_taggingno sensitive capability
  • get_taxonomyno sensitive capability
  • get_trashed_assetsno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • get_webhook_logsno sensitive capability
  • get_workflowno sensitive capability
  • list_access_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_auto_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_bulk_jobsno sensitive capability
  • list_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_contributionsno sensitive capability
  • list_creator_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_crop_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_custom_meta_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_filter_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_ingestionsno sensitive capability
  • list_invitesno sensitive capability
  • list_lightboxesno sensitive capability
  • list_membershipsno sensitive capability
  • list_meta_importsno sensitive capability
  • list_notificationsno sensitive capability
  • list_personal_access_tokensno sensitive capability
  • list_rights_packagesno sensitive capability
  • list_search_queriesno sensitive capability
  • list_share_linksno sensitive capability
  • list_storage_foldersno sensitive capability
  • list_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_taxonomiesno sensitive capability
  • list_taxonomy_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_uploadsno sensitive capability
  • list_user_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • list_workflowsno sensitive capability
  • Mediagraph Assetno sensitive capability
  • Mediagraph Collectionno sensitive capability
  • Mediagraph Lightboxno sensitive capability
  • Mediagraph Searchno sensitive capability
  • merge_tagsno sensitive capability
  • reauthorizeno sensitive capability
  • resend_inviteno sensitive capability
  • revert_assetno sensitive capability
  • search_assetsno sensitive capability
  • submit_access_requestno sensitive capability
  • update_assetno sensitive capability
  • update_collectionno sensitive capability
  • update_commentno sensitive capability
  • update_filter_groupno sensitive capability
  • update_filter_group_visibilityno sensitive capability
  • update_inviteno sensitive capability
  • update_lightboxno sensitive capability
  • update_membershipno sensitive capability
  • update_tagno sensitive capability
  • whoamino sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.16 latest B 89/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: B · 89/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @mediagraph/mcp --online

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Other implementations of Mediagraph 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

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