Md2wechat (npm) MCP Server
md2wechat-mcp
npm
v0.2.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 2.1 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 11 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "wechat_markdown_to_draft"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "wechat_markdown_to_draft" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow wechat_markdown_to_draft
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "wechat_upload_image"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "wechat_upload_image" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow wechat_upload_image
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "wechat_add_material"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "wechat_add_material" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow wechat_add_material
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([convert_markdown_to_wechat_html, wechat_markdown_to_draft, wechat_upload_image, wechat_add_material]) and tools that can send data out ([wechat_markdown_to_draft, wechat_upload_image, wechat_add_material]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "content_source_url" on "wechat_markdown_to_draft"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "wechat_markdown_to_draft" takes a URL/host parameter "content_source_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool wechat_markdown_to_draft · inputSchema.properties.content_source_url
low Unconstrained path parameter "markdown_path" on "convert_markdown_to_wechat_html"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "convert_markdown_to_wechat_html" takes a path parameter "markdown_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool convert_markdown_to_wechat_html · inputSchema.properties.markdown_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "markdown_path" on "wechat_markdown_to_draft"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "wechat_markdown_to_draft" takes a path parameter "markdown_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool wechat_markdown_to_draft · inputSchema.properties.markdown_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "wechat_upload_image"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "wechat_upload_image" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool wechat_upload_image · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "wechat_add_material"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "wechat_add_material" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool wechat_add_material · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"md2wechat-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package md2wechat-mcp
Toxic flows 4
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.3 latest |
B 87/100 | 11 | 1.7.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan md2wechat-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Md2wechat 1
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