Md0ar Gsd MCP Server
@md0ar/gsd-mcp-server
npm
v2.1.0
Published by @md0ar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the GSD (Get Shit Done) lifecycle framework — manage specs, phases, milestones, and project state via MCP tools and resources
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-all.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-all.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, rmSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; // Clean u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-all.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-edge.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-edge.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, rmSync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; // Clean u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-edge.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-functional.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-functional.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, existsSync, rmSync } from "fs";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-functional.mjs
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gsd_add_phaseno sensitive capabilitygsd_add_todono sensitive capabilitygsd_audit_uatno sensitive capabilitygsd_check_todosno sensitive capabilitygsd_commitno sensitive capabilitygsd_complete_milestoneno sensitive capabilitygsd_config_getno sensitive capabilitygsd_config_setno sensitive capabilitygsd_debugno sensitive capabilitygsd_discuss_phaseno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
gsd_execute_phaseno sensitive capabilitygsd_insert_phaseno sensitive capabilitygsd_list_phasesno sensitive capabilitygsd_map_codebaseno sensitive capabilitygsd_new_milestoneno sensitive capabilitygsd_new_projectno sensitive capabilitygsd_phase_completeno sensitive capabilitygsd_plan_phaseno sensitive capabilitygsd_progressno sensitive capabilitygsd_quickno sensitive capabilitygsd_roadmap_analyzeno sensitive capabilitygsd_runno sensitive capabilitygsd_scaffoldno sensitive capabilitygsd_set_profileno sensitive capabilitygsd_settingsno sensitive capabilitygsd_shipno sensitive capabilitygsd_sketchno sensitive capabilitygsd_spikeno sensitive capabilitygsd_stateno sensitive capabilitygsd_todo_completeno sensitive capabilitygsd_validateno sensitive capabilitygsd_verify_workno sensitive capabilitygsd_websearchno sensitive capabilitygsd_workstreamsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @md0ar/gsd-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Md0ar Gsd 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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