@mcpmesh/cli
npm
v3.7.1
Source verified
Published by dhyansraj — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
CLI for MCP Mesh — build distributed AI agents with auto-discovery, dependency injection, and LLM integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 0 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
✓ No adoption-risk deductions — minimal blast radius, verified enough, and fully inspected.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`install.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path"); const child_process = require("child_process"); const VERSION = require("./package.json").version; /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server install.js
"@mcpmesh/cli" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node install.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @mcpmesh/cli
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.7.1 latest |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.7.0 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v3.6.0 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v3.5.2 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v3.5.1 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v3.4.0 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v3.3.2 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
v3.3.1 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v3.3.0 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v3.2.3 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @mcpmesh/cli --online
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