Mcpm (pathintegral-institute) MCP Server
mcpm
PyPI
v2.15.0
Published by pathintegral-institute — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCPM - Model Context Protocol Manager
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/commands/client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/commands/client.py:783`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: S and Linux subprocess.run(["open", config_path] if os.uname().sysname == "Darwin" else ["xdg-open", config_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/commands/client.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/commands/doctor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/commands/doctor.py:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: version = subprocess.check_output([tool_path, "--version"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).decode().strip()
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/commands/doctor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/commands/edit.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/commands/edit.py:503`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: S and Linux subprocess.run(["open", config_path] if os.uname().sysname == "Darwin" else ["xdg-open", config_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/commands/edit.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/commands/inspect.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/commands/inspect.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d) returncode = subprocess.call(cmd_parts) if returncode == 0: console.print("[bold green]I
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/commands/inspect.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/commands/profile/inspect.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/commands/profile/inspect.py:130`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: returncode = subprocess.call(cmd_parts) except KeyboardInterrupt: console.print("\\n[bol
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/commands/profile/inspect.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/commands/update.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/commands/update.py:382`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( command, shell=True, cwd=str(cwd),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/commands/update.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/core/tunnel.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/core/tunnel.py:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e") self.proc = subprocess.Popen(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, start_new_session=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/core/tunnel.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcpm/utils/git.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcpm/utils/git.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: join(cmd)}") return subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=tim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcpm/utils/git.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_git_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_git_utils.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: o" repo.mkdir() subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "main"], cwd=str(repo), capture_output=True) subprocess
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_git_utils.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.15.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcpm --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Mcpm 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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