Youtube Intelligence (JangHyuckYun) MCP Server
mcp-youtube-intelligence
PyPI
v0.1.3
Published by janghyuckyun — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for YouTube video intelligence — transcripts, summaries, entities, topic segmentation, and channel monitoring. Token-optimized for LLM context windows.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/collector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/collector.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [yt_dlp, "--print", "channel_id", "--print", "channel",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/collector.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/comments.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/comments.py:173`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as tmpdir: subprocess.run( [yt_dlp, "--write-comments", "--extractor-args"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/comments.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/monitor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/monitor.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ideos" result = subprocess.run( [ "yt-dlp", "--flat-playlist", "--pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/monitor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/playlist.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/playlist.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [ yt_dlp, "--flat-playlist",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/playlist.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/search.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/search.py:111`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [yt_dlp, "--flat-playlist", "--dump-json", search_url],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/search.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/transcript.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/transcript.py:129`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120) if proc.returncode != 0
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_youtube_intelligence/core/transcript.py
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
monitor_channelingests untrusted inputextract_entitiesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_reportno sensitive capabilityget_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_playlistno sensitive capabilityget_transcriptno sensitive capabilityget_videono sensitive capabilitysearch_transcriptsno sensitive capabilitysearch_youtubeno sensitive capabilitysegment_topicsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-youtube-intelligence --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Youtube Intelligence 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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