Wordpress Crunchtools MCP Server
mcp-wordpress-crunchtools
PyPI
v0.5.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 2.1 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 8 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([wordpress_get_page]) co-exist with external-action tools ([wordpress_create_comment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [wordpress_get_page] → sinks [wordpress_create_comment]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow wordpress_get_page → wordpress_create_comment
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"mcp-wordpress-crunchtools" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package mcp-wordpress-crunchtools
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
wordpress_create_commentnetwork egresswordpress_get_pageingests untrusted inputwordpress_create_pageno sensitive capabilitywordpress_create_postno sensitive capabilitywordpress_delete_commentno sensitive capabilitywordpress_delete_mediano sensitive capabilitywordpress_delete_pageno sensitive capabilitywordpress_delete_postno sensitive capabilitywordpress_get_commentno sensitive capabilitywordpress_get_mediano sensitive capabilitywordpress_get_media_urlno sensitive capabilitywordpress_get_postno sensitive capabilitywordpress_get_revisionno sensitive capabilitywordpress_get_site_infono sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_categoriesno sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_commentsno sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_mediano sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_page_revisionsno sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_pagesno sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_postsno sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_revisionsno sensitive capabilitywordpress_list_tagsno sensitive capabilitywordpress_moderate_commentno sensitive capabilitywordpress_search_postsno sensitive capabilitywordpress_test_connectionno sensitive capabilitywordpress_update_commentno sensitive capabilitywordpress_update_mediano sensitive capabilitywordpress_update_pageno sensitive capabilitywordpress_update_postno sensitive capabilitywordpress_upload_mediano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 90/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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