Tools Bundle MCP Server
mcp-tools-bundle
PyPI
v1.3.1
Published by ameobius-team — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([scrape_page]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, send_email_batch]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [scrape_page] → sinks [send_email, send_email_batch]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow scrape_page → send_email
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_install_script.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_install_script.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _errors(): result = subprocess.run( ["bash", "-n", str(REPO_ROOT / "install.sh")], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_install_script.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
scrape_pageingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresssend_email_batchnetwork egresscheck_mx_recordsno sensitive capabilityclick_elementno sensitive capabilityextract_imagesno sensitive capabilityextract_linksno sensitive capabilityextract_tableno sensitive capabilityextract_textno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
get_btc_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_btc_transactionsno sensitive capabilityget_erc20_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_eth_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_fear_greedno sensitive capabilityget_gas_priceno sensitive capabilityget_htmlno sensitive capabilityget_portfolio_valueno sensitive capabilityget_priceno sensitive capabilityget_price_binanceno sensitive capabilityis_disposableno sensitive capabilityis_role_basedno sensitive capabilitylist_tabsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_addressno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscroll_tono sensitive capabilitytest_smtp_connectionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_emailno sensitive capabilityvalidate_email_batchno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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