Stealth Chrome MCP Server
mcp-stealth-chrome
PyPI
v0.10.1
Published by robithyusuf — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Stealth Chrome MCP server — nodriver + Chromium + 80+ tools with Cloudflare/Turnstile bypass, CapSolver, storage-state reuse
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "spawn_browser" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_browser" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_browser
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_stealth_chrome/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_stealth_chrome/server.py:1613`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: completed = subprocess.run( ["open", "-a", str(app)], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_stealth_chrome/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_stealth_chrome/state.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_stealth_chrome/state.py:194`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: process r = subprocess.run( ["tasklist", "/FI", f"PID eq {pid}", "/NH", "/FO", "CSV"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_stealth_chrome/state.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([network_start, get_page_errors, scrape_page, wait_for_network_idle, web_search, scrape_markdown, smart_fetch]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file, export_curl, spawn_browser, http_request_with_session, http_request]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [network_start, get_page_errors, scrape_page, wait_for_network_idle, web_search, scrape_markdown, smart_fetch] → sinks [upload_file, export_curl, spaw
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow network_start → upload_file
low Mutating tool "spawn_browser" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_browser" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_browser
Tools 160
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_curlnetwork egressget_page_errorsingests untrusted inputhttp_requestnetwork egresshttp_request_with_sessionnetwork egressnetwork_startingests untrusted inputscrape_markdowningests untrusted inputscrape_pageingests untrusted inputsmart_fetchingests untrusted inputspawn_browserruns code / shellupload_filenetwork egress
Show 150 more tools ↓
wait_for_network_idleingests untrusted inputweb_searchingests untrusted inputaccessibility_snapshotno sensitive capabilityassert_clickableno sensitive capabilityassert_element_visibleno sensitive capabilityassert_text_presentno sensitive capabilityassert_url_matchesno sensitive capabilityattach_to_chromeno sensitive capabilityauth_captureno sensitive capabilitybatch_actionsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_launchno sensitive capabilitybrowser_recoverno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitycache_clearno sensitive capabilitycheckno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclick_and_waitno sensitive capabilityclick_at_cornerno sensitive capabilityclick_at_imageno sensitive capabilityclick_element_offsetno sensitive capabilityclick_roleno sensitive capabilityclick_textno sensitive capabilityclick_turnstileno sensitive capabilityclone_chrome_profileno sensitive capabilityclose_all_instancesno sensitive capabilityclose_instanceno sensitive capabilityconsole_clearno sensitive capabilityconsole_getno sensitive capabilityconsole_startno sensitive capabilitycookie_deleteno sensitive capabilitycookie_exportno sensitive capabilitycookie_importno sensitive capabilitycookie_listno sensitive capabilitycookie_setno sensitive capabilitycoverage_startno sensitive capabilitycoverage_stopno sensitive capabilitydeep_researchno sensitive capabilitydescribe_pageno sensitive capabilitydetachno sensitive capabilitydetect_and_bypassno sensitive capabilitydetect_anti_botno sensitive capabilitydetect_content_patternno sensitive capabilitydialog_auto_handleno sensitive capabilitydialog_handleno sensitive capabilitydrag_and_dropno sensitive capabilitydry_runno sensitive capabilityemulate_cpuno sensitive capabilityemulate_deviceno sensitive capabilityemulate_networkno sensitive capabilityevaluateno sensitive capabilityexport_harno sensitive capabilityextract_structuredno sensitive capabilityextract_tableno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capabilityfind_by_imageno sensitive capabilityfingerprint_auditno sensitive capabilityfingerprint_rotateno sensitive capabilityform_introspectno sensitive capabilityframe_evaluateno sensitive capabilityget_attributeno sensitive capabilityget_htmlno sensitive capabilityget_linksno sensitive capabilityget_textno sensitive capabilityget_urlno sensitive capabilityget_viewport_sizeno sensitive capabilitygithub_readno sensitive capabilitygo_backno sensitive capabilitygo_forwardno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilityhttp_session_cookiesno sensitive capabilityhumanize_clickno sensitive capabilityhumanize_typeno sensitive capabilityidentity_pinno sensitive capabilityidentity_showno sensitive capabilityindexeddb_deleteno sensitive capabilityindexeddb_listno sensitive capabilityinject_init_scriptno sensitive capabilityinspect_elementno sensitive capabilityinstance_describeno sensitive capabilityintercept_logno sensitive capabilityintercept_startno sensitive capabilityintercept_stopno sensitive capabilitylist_chrome_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_external_chromeno sensitive capabilitylist_framesno sensitive capabilitylist_instancesno sensitive capabilitylocalstorage_clearno sensitive capabilitylocalstorage_getno sensitive capabilitylocalstorage_setno sensitive capabilitymemory_heap_snapshotno sensitive capabilitymouse_click_xyno sensitive capabilitymouse_driftno sensitive capabilitymouse_moveno sensitive capabilitymouse_recordno sensitive capabilitymouse_replayno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilitynavigate_and_snapshotno sensitive capabilitynetwork_getno sensitive capabilitypaste_textno sensitive capabilityperformance_metricsno sensitive capabilityperformance_timelineno sensitive capabilityperformance_trace_startno sensitive capabilityperformance_trace_stopno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityquery_selector_allno sensitive capabilityreloadno sensitive capabilityrequest_human_helpno sensitive capabilitysave_pdfno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityscroll_tono sensitive capabilitysearch_pageno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilityserver_statusno sensitive capabilitysession_warmupno sensitive capabilitysessionstorage_clearno sensitive capabilitysessionstorage_getno sensitive capabilitysessionstorage_setno sensitive capabilityset_viewport_sizeno sensitive capabilitysmart_fillno sensitive capabilitysocial_digestno sensitive capabilitysocial_researchno sensitive capabilitysolve_captchano sensitive capabilitysolve_recaptcha_aino sensitive capabilitystorage_diffno sensitive capabilitystorage_snapshotno sensitive capabilitystorage_state_loadno sensitive capabilitystorage_state_saveno sensitive capabilityswitch_instanceno sensitive capabilitytab_closeno sensitive capabilitytab_focusno sensitive capabilitytab_listno sensitive capabilitytab_newno sensitive capabilitytab_selectno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityuncheckno sensitive capabilityverify_cfno sensitive capabilityvision_locateno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capabilitywait_for_changeno sensitive capabilitywait_for_humanno sensitive capabilitywait_for_navigationno sensitive capabilitywait_for_requestno sensitive capabilitywait_for_responseno sensitive capabilitywait_for_urlno sensitive capabilityweb_vitalsno sensitive capabilityworkflow_runno sensitive capabilityyoutube_readno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (160 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.9.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.8.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-stealth-chrome --online --registry pypiMore in Browser Automation
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates AgentQL data extraction capabilities.
Screenshot any URL or HTML as PNG/JPEG/WebP from your AI agent. Full-page, clean, no install.
MCP server for aria51 accessibility scanner
Bridge any browser web app to Claude Code via MCP
Browserbase’s official MCP server: cloud headless browsers for agents, with sessions and screenshots.
MCP server for AI web browser automation using Browserbase and Stagehand