Ssh Vps (LuxVTZ) MCP Server
mcp-ssh-vps
PyPI
v0.7.1
Published by luxvtz — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 26
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_directory → list_files → execute_command. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_directory → list_files → execute_command
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (sshmcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`sshmcp/cli.py:115`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , "-k", default="~/.ssh/id_rsa", help="Path to SSH private key" ) @click.option("--password", help="SSH password (will p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server sshmcp/cli.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (sshmcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`sshmcp/server.py:332`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: key_path: str = "~/.ssh/id_rsa", password: str | None = None, description: str | None = None, security_level
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server sshmcp/server.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (sshmcp/tools/servers.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`sshmcp/tools/servers.py:125`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: key_path: str = "~/.ssh/id_rsa", password: str | None = None, description: str | None = None, security_level
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server sshmcp/tools/servers.py
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
high Tool "execute_command_streaming" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command_streaming" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command_streaming
high Tool "shell_start" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_start" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_start
high Tool "shell_send" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_send" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_send
high Tool "shell_recv" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_recv" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_recv
high Tool "shell_close" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_close" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_close
high Tool "shell_list" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_list" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_list
high Shell/command execution in server code (sshmcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`sshmcp/cli.py:291`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t("EDITOR", "nano") os.system(f"{editor} {config_path}") @server.command("import-ssh") @click.option("--ssh-config
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server sshmcp/cli.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_alerts.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_alerts.py:28`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "key", key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"), security=SecurityConfig(), ) class TestAlert: """Tests for Alert dat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_alerts.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_async_client.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_async_client.py:19`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "key", key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"), security=SecurityConfig( allowed_commands=[".*"], forb
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_async_client.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:55`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y", "key_path": "~/.ssh/id_rsa"}, "security": { "allowed_commands":
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_commands.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_commands.py:24`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "key", key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"), security=SecurityConfig( allowed_commands=[".*"], forb
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_commands.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_config.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_config.py:21`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y", "key_path": "~/.ssh/id_rsa"}, "security": {"allowed_commands": [".*"], "timeout_seconds": 30},
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_config.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_container.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_container.py:171`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "key", key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"), security=SecurityConfig(), ) config = MachinesConfig(machi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_container.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_files.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_files.py:23`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "key", key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"), security=SecurityConfig( allowed_commands=[".*"], forb
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_files.py
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Mutating tool "execute_command_streaming" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command_streaming" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command_streaming
low Mutating tool "shell_start" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_start" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_start
low Mutating tool "shell_send" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_send" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_send
low Mutating tool "shell_recv" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_recv" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_recv
low Mutating tool "shell_close" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_close" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_close
low Mutating tool "shell_list" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_list" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_list
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_directoryingests untrusted inputexecute_commandruns code / shellexecute_command_streamingruns code / shelllist_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive datashell_closeruns code / shellshell_listruns code / shellshell_recvruns code / shellshell_sendruns code / shellshell_startruns code / shell
Show 23 more tools ↓
upload_filenetwork egressadd_serverno sensitive capabilityclear_alertno sensitive capabilityclose_forwardno sensitive capabilityexecute_on_multipleno sensitive capabilityforward_localno sensitive capabilityforward_remoteno sensitive capabilityget_active_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_allowed_commandsno sensitive capabilityget_available_machinesno sensitive capabilityget_command_historyno sensitive capabilityget_command_statsno sensitive capabilityget_helpno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilitylist_forwardsno sensitive capabilitylist_serversno sensitive capabilitymanage_processno sensitive capabilityremove_serverno sensitive capabilitysearch_command_historyno sensitive capabilitysync_directoryno sensitive capabilitytest_connectionno sensitive capabilityupload_directoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 26 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-ssh-vps --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Ssh Vps 1
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