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Ssh (DBeidachazi) MCP Server

mcp-ssh PyPI v0.2.7

Published by dbeidachazi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for managing persistent SSH sessions

View on PyPI ↗ Repository ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗
Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 9

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command_enhanced, execute_command, execute_command_async]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [read_file] → sinks [execute_command_enhanced, execute_command, execute_command_async]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow read_file → execute_command_enhanced

high Tool "execute_command_enhanced" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "execute_command_enhanced" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool execute_command_enhanced

high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool execute_command

high Tool "execute_command_async" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "execute_command_async" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool execute_command_async

medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool write_file

low Mutating tool "execute_command_enhanced" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "execute_command_enhanced" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool execute_command_enhanced

low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool execute_command

low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool write_file

low Mutating tool "execute_command_async" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "execute_command_async" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool execute_command_async

Tools 21

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • execute_commandruns code / shell
  • execute_command_asyncruns code / shell
  • execute_command_enhancedruns code / shell
  • read_filereads sensitive data
  • write_filewrites files
  • close_all_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • close_sessionno sensitive capability
  • get_command_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_command_status_enhancedno sensitive capability
  • get_connection_health_reportno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
  • get_performance_metricsno sensitive capability
  • get_session_diagnosticsno sensitive capability
  • interrupt_command_by_idno sensitive capability
  • list_command_historyno sensitive capability
  • list_running_commandsno sensitive capability
  • list_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • read_screenno sensitive capability
  • reset_session_promptno sensitive capability
  • send_inputno sensitive capability
  • send_input_by_sessionno sensitive capability
  • send_keysno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.7 latest A 93/100 9 1.13.0 2026-08-25
v0.2.5 A 93/100 9 1.12.1 2026-08-14

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-ssh --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Ssh 26

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A
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