Souschef MCP Server
mcp-souschef
PyPI
v7.3.1
Published by kpeacocke — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 27
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([parse_powershell, convert_powershell, generate_powershell_role, generate_powershell_job_template, analyze_powershell_fidelity, parse_bash_script, convert_bash_to_ansible, generate_ansible_role_from_bash]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [read_file] → sinks [parse_powershell, convert_powershell, generate_powershell_role, generate_powershell_job_template, analyze_powershell_fidelity, pars
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow read_file → parse_powershell
high Tool "parse_powershell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "parse_powershell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool parse_powershell
high Tool "convert_powershell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "convert_powershell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool convert_powershell
high Tool "generate_powershell_role" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "generate_powershell_role" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool generate_powershell_role
high Tool "generate_powershell_job_template" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "generate_powershell_job_template" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool generate_powershell_job_template
high Tool "analyze_powershell_fidelity" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "analyze_powershell_fidelity" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool analyze_powershell_fidelity
high Tool "parse_bash_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "parse_bash_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool parse_bash_script
high Tool "convert_bash_to_ansible" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "convert_bash_to_ansible" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool convert_bash_to_ansible
high Tool "generate_ansible_role_from_bash" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "generate_ansible_role_from_bash" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool generate_ansible_role_from_bash
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/ansible_upgrade.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/ansible_upgrade.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: alls use list args, not shell=True from datetime import date from pathlib import Path from typing import Any, NotRequire
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/ansible_upgrade.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/cli/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/cli/__init__.py:1667`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: p the server") subprocess.run(cmd, check=True) except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: click.ec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/cli/__init__.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/converters/playbook.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/converters/playbook.py:919`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ailure result = subprocess.run( ["ansible-lint", "--nocolor", "-p", tmp_path], capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/converters/playbook.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/generators/repo.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/generators/repo.py:601`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Initialize git subprocess.run( ["git", "init"], cwd=repo_path, check=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/generators/repo.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/migration_v2.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/migration_v2.py:1479`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s] result = subprocess.run( ["ansible-lint", "--nocolor", *playbook_paths],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/migration_v2.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/parsers/ansible_inventory.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/parsers/ansible_inventory.py:374`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=10
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/parsers/ansible_inventory.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/parsers/powershell.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/parsers/powershell.py:345`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: turn None result = subprocess.run( [ pwsh_path, "-NoLogo", "-NoProfile"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/parsers/powershell.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/ui/pages/cookbook_analysis.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/ui/pages/cookbook_analysis.py:2470`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["which", "git"], capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/ui/pages/cookbook_analysis.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (souschef/ui/pages/validation_reports.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`souschef/ui/pages/validation_reports.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "ansible_lint", str(playbook_path)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/ui/pages/validation_reports.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (souschef/assessment.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`souschef/assessment.py:2901`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.post( "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", headers={
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server souschef/assessment.py
low Mutating tool "parse_powershell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "parse_powershell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool parse_powershell
low Mutating tool "convert_powershell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "convert_powershell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool convert_powershell
low Mutating tool "generate_powershell_role" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "generate_powershell_role" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool generate_powershell_role
low Mutating tool "generate_powershell_job_template" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "generate_powershell_job_template" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool generate_powershell_job_template
low Mutating tool "analyze_powershell_fidelity" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "analyze_powershell_fidelity" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool analyze_powershell_fidelity
low Mutating tool "parse_bash_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "parse_bash_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool parse_bash_script
low Mutating tool "convert_bash_to_ansible" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "convert_bash_to_ansible" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool convert_bash_to_ansible
low Mutating tool "generate_ansible_role_from_bash" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "generate_ansible_role_from_bash" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool generate_ansible_role_from_bash
Tools 97
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_powershell_fidelityruns code / shellconvert_bash_to_ansibleruns code / shellconvert_powershellruns code / shellgenerate_ansible_role_from_bashruns code / shellgenerate_powershell_job_templateruns code / shellgenerate_powershell_roleruns code / shellparse_bash_scriptruns code / shellparse_powershellruns code / shellread_filereads sensitive data_validate_databags_directoryno sensitive capability
Show 87 more tools ↓
analyse_chef_databag_usageno sensitive capabilityanalyse_chef_environment_usageno sensitive capabilityanalyse_chef_search_patternsno sensitive capabilityanalyse_cookbook_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityassess_ansible_upgrade_readinessno sensitive capabilityassess_chef_migration_complexityno sensitive capabilityassess_salt_migration_complexityno sensitive capabilityassign_github_copilot_to_issueno sensitive capabilitycheck_ansible_eol_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_github_copilot_agent_statusno sensitive capabilityconfigure_migration_simulationno sensitive capabilityconvert_all_cookbooks_comprehensiveno sensitive capabilityconvert_chef_databag_to_varsno sensitive capabilityconvert_chef_environment_to_inventory_groupno sensitive capabilityconvert_chef_handler_to_ansibleno sensitive capabilityconvert_cookbook_comprehensiveno sensitive capabilityconvert_inspec_to_testno sensitive capabilityconvert_puppet_manifest_to_ansibleno sensitive capabilityconvert_puppet_manifest_to_ansible_with_aino sensitive capabilityconvert_puppet_module_to_ansibleno sensitive capabilityconvert_puppet_module_to_ansible_with_aino sensitive capabilityconvert_puppet_resource_to_taskno sensitive capabilityconvert_resource_to_taskno sensitive capabilityconvert_salt_directory_to_ansibleno sensitive capabilityconvert_salt_pillar_to_varsno sensitive capabilityconvert_salt_to_ansibleno sensitive capabilityconvert_template_with_aino sensitive capabilitydeploy_v2_migrationno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ansible_repositoryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ansible_upgrade_test_planno sensitive capabilitygenerate_github_workflow_from_chefno sensitive capabilitygenerate_gitlab_ci_from_chefno sensitive capabilitygenerate_handler_routing_configno sensitive capabilitygenerate_inspec_from_recipeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_inventory_from_chef_environmentsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_jenkinsfile_from_chefno sensitive capabilitygenerate_migration_planno sensitive capabilitygenerate_migration_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_salt_inventoryno sensitive capabilitygenerate_salt_migration_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_windows_inventory_toolno sensitive capabilitygenerate_windows_requirementsno sensitive capabilityget_chef_cookbooksno sensitive capabilityget_chef_environmentsno sensitive capabilityget_chef_nodesno sensitive capabilityget_chef_policiesno sensitive capabilityget_chef_rolesno sensitive capabilityget_version_combination_infono sensitive capabilityimport_offline_bundleno sensitive capabilityimport_puppet_catalog_to_irno sensitive capabilitylist_cookbook_structureno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_migration_version_combinationsno sensitive capabilitylist_puppet_server_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_puppet_supported_resource_typesno sensitive capabilityparse_attributesno sensitive capabilityparse_chef_handlerno sensitive capabilityparse_chef_migration_assessmentno sensitive capabilityparse_cookbook_metadatano sensitive capabilityparse_custom_resourceno sensitive capabilityparse_habitat_planno sensitive capabilityparse_inspec_profileno sensitive capabilityparse_puppet_manifestno sensitive capabilityparse_puppet_moduleno sensitive capabilityparse_recipeno sensitive capabilityparse_salt_directoryno sensitive capabilityparse_salt_pillarno sensitive capabilityparse_salt_slsno sensitive capabilityparse_salt_topno sensitive capabilityparse_templateno sensitive capabilitypause_github_copilot_agentno sensitive capabilityplan_ansible_upgradeno sensitive capabilityplan_salt_migrationno sensitive capabilityprofile_cookbook_performanceno sensitive capabilityprofile_parsing_operationno sensitive capabilityquery_chef_serverno sensitive capabilityquery_salt_masterno sensitive capabilityread_cookbook_metadatano sensitive capabilityresume_github_copilot_agentno sensitive capabilityrollback_v2_migrationno sensitive capabilitysimulate_chef_to_awx_migrationno sensitive capabilitystart_v2_migrationno sensitive capabilitystop_github_copilot_agentno sensitive capabilityvalidate_ansible_collection_compatibilityno sensitive capabilityvalidate_chef_server_connectionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_conversionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_v2_playbooksno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (97 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v7.3.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 27 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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