Wslc MCP Server
mcp-server-wslc
npm
v1.0.3
Published by aihuali213 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for WSL container management via wslc CLI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Tool "container_create" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "container_create" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool container_create
high Tool "container_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "container_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool container_exec
high Tool "container_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "container_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool container_run
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/wslc.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/wslc.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/wslc.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "container_create"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "container_create" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool container_create · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "container_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "container_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool container_exec · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "container_run"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "container_run" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool container_run · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "container_create" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "container_create" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool container_create
low Mutating tool "container_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "container_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool container_exec
low Mutating tool "container_run" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "container_run" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool container_run
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/utils/wslc.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/utils/wslc.test.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }; }); vi.mock("node:child_process", () => ({ execFile: mockExecFile, })); import { runWslc } from "./wslc.js"; c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/wslc.test.js
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
container_createruns code / shellcontainer_execruns code / shellcontainer_runruns code / shellcontainer_inspectno sensitive capabilitycontainer_logsno sensitive capabilitycontainer_removeno sensitive capabilitycontainer_restartno sensitive capabilitycontainer_startno sensitive capabilitycontainer_statsno sensitive capabilitycontainer_stopno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
image_buildno sensitive capabilityimage_inspectno sensitive capabilityimage_pullno sensitive capabilityimage_pushno sensitive capabilityimage_removeno sensitive capabilityimage_tagno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilitynetwork_createno sensitive capabilitynetwork_listno sensitive capabilitynetwork_removeno sensitive capabilityregistry_loginno sensitive capabilityregistry_logoutno sensitive capabilitysystem_pruneno sensitive capabilitysystem_versionno sensitive capabilityvolume_createno sensitive capabilityvolume_listno sensitive capabilityvolume_removeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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