Unipile MCP Server
mcp-server-unipile
PyPI
v0.1.5
Published by sundeepg98 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A comprehensive MCP server for the Unipile API — 96 tools for messaging, email, calendar, LinkedIn, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_message_attachment, get_email_attachment, get_applicant_resume]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, forward_message, send_email, create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_message_attachment, get_email_attachment, get_applicant_resume] → sinks [send_message, forward_message, send_email, create_webhook, delete_webhoo
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_message_attachment → send_message
Tools 96
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressforward_messagenetwork egressget_applicant_resumeingests untrusted inputget_email_attachmentingests untrusted inputget_message_attachmentingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresssend_messagenetwork egressaccept_invitationno sensitive capabilityadd_message_reactionno sensitive capability
Show 86 more tools ↓
cancel_invitationno sensitive capabilityclose_jobno sensitive capabilitycomment_on_postno sensitive capabilityconnect_accountno sensitive capabilitycreate_email_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_jobno sensitive capabilitycreate_postno sensitive capabilitydecline_invitationno sensitive capabilitydelete_accountno sensitive capabilitydelete_chatno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_messageno sensitive capabilityedit_eventno sensitive capabilityedit_jobno sensitive capabilityedit_own_profileno sensitive capabilityendorse_skillno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_attendeeno sensitive capabilityget_attendee_pictureno sensitive capabilityget_calendarno sensitive capabilityget_chatno sensitive capabilityget_chat_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_company_profileno sensitive capabilityget_emailno sensitive capabilityget_email_folderno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_hiring_projectno sensitive capabilityget_hiring_projectsno sensitive capabilityget_inmail_creditsno sensitive capabilityget_jobno sensitive capabilityget_job_applicantno sensitive capabilityget_job_applicantsno sensitive capabilityget_messageno sensitive capabilityget_my_profileno sensitive capabilityget_postno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_profile_visitorsno sensitive capabilityget_search_paramsno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_attendeesno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_chat_attendeesno sensitive capabilitylist_chatsno sensitive capabilitylist_chats_by_attendeeno sensitive capabilitylist_email_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_email_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_followersno sensitive capabilitylist_followingno sensitive capabilitylist_invitations_receivedno sensitive capabilitylist_invitations_sentno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_messages_by_attendeeno sensitive capabilitylist_post_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_post_reactionsno sensitive capabilitylist_relationsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_postsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_reactionsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilityperform_linkedin_actionno sensitive capabilitypublish_jobno sensitive capabilityraw_linkedin_requestno sensitive capabilityreact_to_postno sensitive capabilityreconnect_accountno sensitive capabilityresend_checkpointno sensitive capabilityrestart_accountno sensitive capabilityresync_accountno sensitive capabilitysearch_companiesno sensitive capabilitysearch_jobsno sensitive capabilitysearch_peopleno sensitive capabilitysearch_people_sales_navno sensitive capabilitysearch_postsno sensitive capabilitysend_inmailno sensitive capabilitysend_invitationno sensitive capabilitysolve_checkpointno sensitive capabilitysolve_job_checkpointno sensitive capabilitystart_chatno sensitive capabilitysync_chatno sensitive capabilityupdate_account_proxyno sensitive capabilityupdate_chatno sensitive capabilityupdate_emailno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (96 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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