Tapd (PyPI) MCP Server

mcp-server-tapd PyPI v8.0.81

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

TAPD MCP Server

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_image, get_entity_attachments]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_comments]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_image, get_entity_attachments] → sinks [create_comments]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_image → create_comments

Tools 44

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_commentsnetwork egress
  • get_entity_attachmentsingests untrusted input
  • get_imageingests untrusted input
  • add_timesheetsno sensitive capability
  • create_bugno sensitive capability
  • create_iterationno sensitive capability
  • create_or_update_tcasesno sensitive capability
  • create_story_or_taskno sensitive capability
  • create_tcases_batchno sensitive capability
  • create_wikino sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
  • entity_relationsno sensitive capability
  • get_bugno sensitive capability
  • get_bug_countno sensitive capability
  • get_commentsno sensitive capability
  • get_commit_msgno sensitive capability
  • get_entity_custom_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • get_entity_relationsno sensitive capability
  • get_iterationsno sensitive capability
  • get_related_bugsno sensitive capability
  • get_release_infono sensitive capability
  • get_stories_fields_infono sensitive capability
  • get_stories_fields_lableno sensitive capability
  • get_stories_or_tasksno sensitive capability
  • get_story_or_task_countno sensitive capability
  • get_sub_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • get_tcasesno sensitive capability
  • get_timesheetsno sensitive capability
  • get_todono sensitive capability
  • get_user_participant_projectsno sensitive capability
  • get_wikino sensitive capability
  • get_workflows_all_transitionsno sensitive capability
  • get_workflows_last_stepsno sensitive capability
  • get_workflows_status_mapno sensitive capability
  • get_workitem_typesno sensitive capability
  • get_workspace_infono sensitive capability
  • get_workspace_usersno sensitive capability
  • program_bind_entitiesno sensitive capability
  • send_qiwei_messageno sensitive capability
  • update_bugno sensitive capability
  • update_commentsno sensitive capability
  • update_iterationno sensitive capability
  • update_story_or_taskno sensitive capability
  • update_timesheetsno sensitive capability
  • update_wikino sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 3

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v8.0.81 latest A 95/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25
v8.0.80 A 95/100 1 1.12.1 2026-07-31
v8.0.79 A 95/100 1 1.12.1 2026-07-27

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-tapd --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Tapd 2

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →

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