Redcap MCP Server
mcp-server-redcap
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by msicilia — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for REDCap (Research Electronic Data Capture)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesadd_fieldno sensitive capabilityadd_instrumentno sensitive capabilityassign_instrument_to_eventno sensitive capabilitycheck_field_referencesno sensitive capabilityclone_instrumentno sensitive capabilitydelete_armsno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventsno sensitive capabilitydelete_instrumentno sensitive capabilitydelete_recordsno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
export_armsno sensitive capabilityexport_eventsno sensitive capabilityexport_field_namesno sensitive capabilityexport_fileno sensitive capabilityexport_loggingno sensitive capabilityexport_pdfno sensitive capabilityexport_recordsno sensitive capabilityexport_repeating_instruments_eventsno sensitive capabilityexport_reportno sensitive capabilityexport_survey_linkno sensitive capabilityexport_survey_participant_listno sensitive capabilitygenerate_next_record_nameno sensitive capabilityget_instrument_event_mappingsno sensitive capabilityget_instrumentsno sensitive capabilityget_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_structureno sensitive capabilityimport_armsno sensitive capabilityimport_eventsno sensitive capabilityimport_fileno sensitive capabilityimport_recordsno sensitive capabilityimport_repeating_instruments_eventsno sensitive capabilitymove_fieldno sensitive capabilityremove_fieldno sensitive capabilityrename_instrumentno sensitive capabilityunassign_instrument_from_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_fieldno sensitive capabilityvalidate_branching_logicno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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