Kubernetes (Flux159) MCP Server
mcp-server-kubernetes
npm
v4.1.6
Source verified
Published by flux159 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Community Kubernetes server: inspect and manage pods, deployments and services.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/kubectl-flags.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/security/kubectl-flags.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync, } from "child_process"; import { isRemoteTransport } from "./transport.js"; // Flags that would let a ca
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security/kubectl-flags.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/port_forward.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/port_forward.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { McpError } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js"; import { assertSa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/port_forward.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.1.6 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v4.1.4 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v4.1.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v4.1.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v4.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v4.0.9 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v4.0.8 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v4.0.7 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-kubernetes --onlineOther implementations of Kubernetes 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
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