Helm MCP Server
mcp-server-helm
PyPI
v0.2.0.post15
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Helm integration with Claude and other AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "helm_completion" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "helm_completion" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool helm_completion
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_server_helm/core/utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_server_helm/core/utils.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_server_helm/core/utils.py
medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "helm_completion"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "helm_completion" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool helm_completion · inputSchema.properties.shell
low Mutating tool "helm_completion" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "helm_completion" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool helm_completion
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
helm_completionruns code / shellhelm_createno sensitive capabilityhelm_dependency_buildno sensitive capabilityhelm_dependency_listno sensitive capabilityhelm_dependency_updateno sensitive capabilityhelm_envno sensitive capabilityhelm_get_allno sensitive capabilityhelm_get_hooksno sensitive capabilityhelm_get_manifestno sensitive capabilityhelm_get_metadatano sensitive capability
Show 35 more tools ↓
helm_get_notesno sensitive capabilityhelm_get_valuesno sensitive capabilityhelm_historyno sensitive capabilityhelm_installno sensitive capabilityhelm_lintno sensitive capabilityhelm_listno sensitive capabilityhelm_packageno sensitive capabilityhelm_plugin_installno sensitive capabilityhelm_plugin_listno sensitive capabilityhelm_plugin_uninstallno sensitive capabilityhelm_plugin_updateno sensitive capabilityhelm_pullno sensitive capabilityhelm_pushno sensitive capabilityhelm_registry_loginno sensitive capabilityhelm_registry_logoutno sensitive capabilityhelm_repo_addno sensitive capabilityhelm_repo_indexno sensitive capabilityhelm_repo_listno sensitive capabilityhelm_repo_removeno sensitive capabilityhelm_repo_updateno sensitive capabilityhelm_rollbackno sensitive capabilityhelm_search_hubno sensitive capabilityhelm_search_repono sensitive capabilityhelm_show_allno sensitive capabilityhelm_show_chartno sensitive capabilityhelm_show_crdsno sensitive capabilityhelm_show_readmeno sensitive capabilityhelm_show_valuesno sensitive capabilityhelm_statusno sensitive capabilityhelm_templateno sensitive capabilityhelm_testno sensitive capabilityhelm_uninstallno sensitive capabilityhelm_upgradeno sensitive capabilityhelm_verifyno sensitive capabilityhelm_versionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0.post15 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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