For Oscal MCP Server

mcp-server-for-oscal PyPI v0.4.0

Published by awslabs — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
B
83/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 83/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 17.5 = 83/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−15.4 Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code MTC-SRC-004 injection
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 5

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`tests/conftest.py:261`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: dict(os.environ)

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/conftest.py

high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (tests/test_file_integrity_utils.py)MTC-SRC-004

In the server's implementation (`tests/test_file_integrity_utils.py:278`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: \x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/test_file_integrity_utils.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/update_hashes.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`bin/update_hashes.py:84`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/update_hashes.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_server_for_oscal/tools/validate_oscal_content.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_server_for_oscal/tools/validate_oscal_content.py:211`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/mcp_server_for_oscal/tools/validate_oscal_content.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"mcp-server-for-oscal" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package mcp-server-for-oscal

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.4.0 latest B 83/100 5 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 83/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-for-oscal --online --registry pypi

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