Dameng (SpringDamon) MCP Server
mcp-server-dameng
npm
v1.0.6
Published by springdamon — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
达梦数据库 MCP Server - 通过 Model Context Protocol 让 AI 助手直接连接和查询达梦 DM8 数据库
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const setupScript = path.resolve(fileURLToPath(new URL("../scripts/setu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/java-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/java-bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import fs from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/java-bridge.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:29`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt.meta.url))); execSync(`node "${setupScript}"`, { stdio: "inherit" }); return; } const config
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.cjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require("child_process"); const LIB_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, "..", "lib"); const JAVA_DIR = path.re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup.cjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"mcp-server-dameng" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.cjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package mcp-server-dameng
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.6 latest |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-dameng --onlineOther implementations of Dameng 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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