Box (PyPI) MCP Server
mcp-server-box
PyPI
v0.1.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([box_ask_ai_tool, box_hubs_ask_ai_tool, box_download_file_tool, box_docgen_get_job_tool]) co-exist with external-action tools ([box_upload_file_from_path_tool, box_upload_file_from_content_tool, box_chunked_upload_file_tool]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [box_ask_ai_tool, box_hubs_ask_ai_tool, box_download_file_tool, box_docgen_get_job_tool] → sinks [box_upload_file_from_path_tool, box_upload_file_from
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow box_ask_ai_tool → box_upload_file_from_path_tool
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_box_api_ai.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_box_api_ai.py:29`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tr to dict answer = eval(answer) assert isinstance(answer, dict) assert answer.get("contract date") is not N
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_box_api_ai.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
box_ask_ai_toolingests untrusted inputbox_chunked_upload_file_toolnetwork egressbox_docgen_get_job_toolingests untrusted inputbox_download_file_toolingests untrusted inputbox_hubs_ask_ai_toolingests untrusted inputbox_upload_file_from_content_toolnetwork egressbox_upload_file_from_path_toolnetwork egressbox_ai_extract_datano sensitive capabilitybox_ask_ai_tool_multi_fileno sensitive capabilitybox_authorize_app_toolno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
box_chunked_upload_new_version_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_create_share_link_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_create_batch_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_list_jobs_by_batch_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_list_jobs_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_template_create_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_template_delete_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_template_get_by_id_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_template_list_jobs_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_template_list_tags_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_docgen_template_list_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_get_shared_link_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_list_folder_content_by_folder_idno sensitive capabilitybox_manage_folder_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_read_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_remove_shared_link_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_search_folder_by_nameno sensitive capabilitybox_search_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_upload_folder_recursive_toolno sensitive capabilitybox_who_am_ino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 95/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-box --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Box 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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