Bitbucket (JaviMaligno) MCP Server
mcp-server-bitbucket
npm
v0.12.0
Published by javimaligno — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Bitbucket API operations
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: list_directory → get_environment → create_pull_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow list_directory → get_environment → create_pull_request
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "get_file_content"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "get_file_content" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool get_file_content · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 73
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_pull_requestnetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_environmentreads sensitive dataget_file_contentreads sensitive dataget_pipeline_logsreads sensitive datalist_directoryingests untrusted inputadd_pr_commentno sensitive capabilityapprove_prno sensitive capabilitybase_tagno sensitive capability
Show 63 more tools ↓
code_reviewno sensitive capabilitycompare_commitsno sensitive capabilitycreate_branch_restrictionno sensitive capabilitycreate_commit_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_pipeline_variableno sensitive capabilitycreate_repositoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_tagno sensitive capabilitydecline_prno sensitive capabilitydelete_branch_restrictionno sensitive capabilitydelete_group_permissionno sensitive capabilitydelete_pipeline_variableno sensitive capabilitydelete_repositoryno sensitive capabilitydelete_tagno sensitive capabilitydelete_user_permissionno sensitive capabilityget_branchno sensitive capabilityget_commitno sensitive capabilityget_commit_statusesno sensitive capabilityget_group_permissionno sensitive capabilityget_pipelineno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_configno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_variableno sensitive capabilityget_pr_diffno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_repositoryno sensitive capabilityget_user_permissionno sensitive capabilityget_webhookno sensitive capabilityheadno sensitive capabilitylist_branch_restrictionsno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_deployment_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_environmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_group_permissionsno sensitive capabilitylist_pipeline_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitylist_pr_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_permissionsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitypipeline_debugno sensitive capabilitypr_idno sensitive capabilityProjectsno sensitive capabilityPull Requestsno sensitive capabilityrelease_notesno sensitive capabilityrepo_slugno sensitive capabilityrepo_summaryno sensitive capabilityRepositoriesno sensitive capabilityRepository Branchesno sensitive capabilityRepository Detailsno sensitive capabilityrequest_changes_prno sensitive capabilitystop_pipelineno sensitive capabilitytrigger_pipelineno sensitive capabilityunapprove_prno sensitive capabilityupdate_group_permissionno sensitive capabilityupdate_pipeline_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_pipeline_variableno sensitive capabilityupdate_repositoryno sensitive capabilityupdate_user_permissionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (73 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.12.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-server-bitbucket --onlineOther implementations of Bitbucket 24
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 25 side by side →
MCP server for Bitbucket — manage pull requests, branches, and repositories from any MCP client
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Bitbucket Cloud and Server API integration
MCP server for Bitbucket Cloud — read and manage pull requests, branches, and repositories from any MCP client
MCP server for Bitbucket API integration - supports both Cloud and Server
A Model Context Protocol server for Bitbucket with read-only operations
MCP server for Bitbucket Cloud integration
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