Acube MCP Server
mcp-server-acube
npm
v0.4.0
Published by nick-preda — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([schedule_invoice_download, get_download_schedule, update_download_schedule, delete_download_schedule, download_invoices_once]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook_config, update_webhook_config, delete_webhook_config]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [schedule_invoice_download, get_download_schedule, update_download_schedule, delete_download_schedule, download_invoices_once] → sinks [create_webhook
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow schedule_invoice_download → create_webhook_config
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhook_confignetwork egressdelete_download_scheduleingests untrusted inputdelete_webhook_confignetwork egressdownload_invoices_onceingests untrusted inputget_download_scheduleingests untrusted inputschedule_invoice_downloadingests untrusted inputupdate_download_scheduleingests untrusted inputupdate_webhook_confignetwork egresscount_rejected_invoicesno sensitive capabilitycreate_appointeeno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
create_business_registryno sensitive capabilityextract_invoice_from_pdfno sensitive capabilityget_appointeeno sensitive capabilityget_business_registryno sensitive capabilityget_extraction_resultno sensitive capabilityget_extraction_statusno sensitive capabilityget_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_notificationno sensitive capabilityget_receipt_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_webhook_configno sensitive capabilitylist_appointeesno sensitive capabilitylist_business_registriesno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_notificationsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhook_configsno sensitive capabilitymark_notifications_downloadedno sensitive capabilityrecover_rejected_invoicesno sensitive capabilityreturn_receipt_itemsno sensitive capabilitysend_invoiceno sensitive capabilitysend_receiptno sensitive capabilitysend_simplified_invoiceno sensitive capabilityupdate_appointeeno sensitive capabilityupdate_business_registryno sensitive capabilityverify_companyno sensitive capabilityverify_fiscal_idno sensitive capabilityverify_simple_companyno sensitive capabilityverify_split_paymentno sensitive capabilityvoid_receiptno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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