Secure — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-secure-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-secure-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-secure-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 85,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/path-traversal.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/path-traversal.js:56`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/path-traversal.js"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/path-traversal.js",
"line": 56
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/security/layers/layer-utils/semantics/semantic-policies.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/layers/layer-utils/semantics/semantic-policies.js:57`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/semantics/semantic-policies.js"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/semantics/semantic-policies.js",
"line": 57
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/security/utils/tool-registry.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/utils/tool-registry.js:48`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/utils/tool-registry.js"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/security/utils/tool-registry.js",
"line": 48
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"title": "Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/overflow-validation.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/overflow-validation.js:27`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/overflow-validation.js"
},
"evidence": "\\x31\\x50\\x68\\xc0\\xff\\xeb\\xe8\\xe9",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-004",
"file": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/overflow-validation.js",
"line": 27
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js:71`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js",
"line": 71
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/security/config/pattern-categories.js",
"line": 23
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/injection.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/injection.js:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/injection.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/security/layers/layer-utils/content/patterns/injection.js",
"line": 112
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "afb0611a11cd1643d32161fffbdc3224c18b932a2c0b30af5a76ede31ff96ffe",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}