Sap Gui MCP Server
mcp-sap-gui
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP Server for SAP GUI Scripting automation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "sap_read_shell_content" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "sap_read_shell_content" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sap_read_shell_content
low Mutating tool "sap_read_shell_content" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "sap_read_shell_content" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sap_read_shell_content
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_server.py:1546`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return __builtins__.__import__(name, *args, **kwargs) with patch("builtins.__import__", side_effect=_import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_server.py
Tools 59
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
sap_read_shell_contentruns code / shellsap_click_tree_linkno sensitive capabilitysap_collapse_tree_nodeno sensitive capabilitysap_connectno sensitive capabilitysap_connect_existingno sensitive capabilitysap_disconnectno sensitive capabilitysap_double_click_cellno sensitive capabilitysap_double_click_tree_itemno sensitive capabilitysap_double_click_tree_nodeno sensitive capabilitysap_execute_transactionno sensitive capability
Show 49 more tools ↓
sap_expand_tree_nodeno sensitive capabilitysap_find_tree_node_by_pathno sensitive capabilitysap_get_alv_toolbarno sensitive capabilitysap_get_cell_infono sensitive capabilitysap_get_column_infono sensitive capabilitysap_get_combobox_entriesno sensitive capabilitysap_get_current_cellno sensitive capabilitysap_get_popup_windowno sensitive capabilitysap_get_screen_elementsno sensitive capabilitysap_get_screen_infono sensitive capabilitysap_get_session_infono sensitive capabilitysap_get_table_control_row_infono sensitive capabilitysap_get_toolbar_buttonsno sensitive capabilitysap_get_transaction_guideno sensitive capabilitysap_get_tree_node_childrenno sensitive capabilitysap_get_workflow_guideno sensitive capabilitysap_handle_popupno sensitive capabilitysap_list_connectionsno sensitive capabilitysap_modify_cellno sensitive capabilitysap_press_alv_toolbar_buttonno sensitive capabilitysap_press_buttonno sensitive capabilitysap_press_column_headerno sensitive capabilitysap_previewno sensitive capabilitysap_read_fieldno sensitive capabilitysap_read_tableno sensitive capabilitysap_read_texteditno sensitive capabilitysap_read_treeno sensitive capabilitysap_screenshotno sensitive capabilitysap_scroll_table_controlno sensitive capabilitysap_search_tree_nodesno sensitive capabilitysap_select_all_rowsno sensitive capabilitysap_select_all_table_control_columnsno sensitive capabilitysap_select_alv_context_menu_itemno sensitive capabilitysap_select_checkboxno sensitive capabilitysap_select_combobox_entryno sensitive capabilitysap_select_menuno sensitive capabilitysap_select_multiple_rowsno sensitive capabilitysap_select_radio_buttonno sensitive capabilitysap_select_tabno sensitive capabilitysap_select_table_rowno sensitive capabilitysap_select_tree_nodeno sensitive capabilitysap_send_keyno sensitive capabilitysap_set_batch_fieldsno sensitive capabilitysap_set_confirmation_pointsno sensitive capabilitysap_set_current_cellno sensitive capabilitysap_set_fieldno sensitive capabilitysap_set_focusno sensitive capabilitysap_set_policy_profileno sensitive capabilitysap_set_texteditno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (59 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.2.2 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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