Runrunit MCP Server
mcp-runrunit
npm
v1.8.1
Source verified
Published by agencian1 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Runrun.it API - Tasks, Comments, Projects
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2942`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/application/git-repo-detect.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/application/git-repo-detect.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; function runGit(cwd, args) { try { con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/application/git-repo-detect.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:19608`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import path6 from "node:path"; function runGit(cwd, args) { try { const ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([runrunit_get_task]) co-exist with external-action tools ([runrunit_create_comment, runrunit_discord_send_message, runrunit_discord_get_or_create_channel]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [runrunit_get_task] → sinks [runrunit_create_comment, runrunit_discord_send_message, runrunit_discord_get_or_create_channel]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow runrunit_get_task → runrunit_create_comment
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url_antes" on "runrunit_create_comment"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "runrunit_create_comment" takes a URL/host parameter "url_antes" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool runrunit_create_comment · inputSchema.properties.url_antes
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url_depois" on "runrunit_create_comment"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "runrunit_create_comment" takes a URL/host parameter "url_depois" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool runrunit_create_comment · inputSchema.properties.url_depois
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:12`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: HTTPServerTransport } = require(streamableHttpPath); const PORT = Number(process.env.MCP_HTTP_PORT) || 3000; const MCP_P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
runrunit_create_commentnetwork egressrunrunit_discord_get_or_create_channelnetwork egressrunrunit_discord_send_messagenetwork egressrunrunit_get_taskingests untrusted inputrunrunit_assignment_playno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_comment_reactionno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_create_external_commentno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_create_taskno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_create_workflowno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_delete_commentno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
runrunit_delete_taskno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_discord_create_channelno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_discord_list_channelsno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_get_commentno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_get_pr_templateno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_get_task_descriptionno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_install_cursor_agentsno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_install_cursor_skillsno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_board_stagesno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_cursor_catalogno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_subtasksno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_task_commentsno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_task_filtersno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_list_tasksno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_move_task_stageno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_project_detect_platformno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_share_cursor_agentno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_share_cursor_agent_bitbucketno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_share_cursor_skillno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_share_cursor_skill_bitbucketno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_suggest_devs_with_free_queueno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_update_commentno sensitive capabilityrunrunit_update_taskno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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