Roundtable MCP Server

https://mcp.roundtable.now/mcp Remote v1.5.0

Published by mcp.roundtable.now — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Multi-model AI council that debates a question and synthesizes an answer (13 tools incl. review_code, debug_issue).

Open the endpoint ↗ Raw report (JSON) ↗

Trust grade

A

94/100

Last scanned 2026-07-24 get badge →

Trust

A · 94/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Live

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 7

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([get-logs]) and tools that can send data out ([consult-council, design-architecture, review-code, plan-implementation, debug-issue, assess-tradeoffs]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [get-logs] → sinks [consult-council, design-architecture, review-code, plan-implementation, debug-issue, assess-tradeoffs]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow get-logs → consult-council

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "consult-council"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "consult-council" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool consult-council · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "design-architecture"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "design-architecture" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool design-architecture · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "review-code"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "review-code" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool review-code · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "plan-implementation"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "plan-implementation" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool plan-implementation · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "debug-issue"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "debug-issue" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool debug-issue · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "assess-tradeoffs"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "assess-tradeoffs" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool assess-tradeoffs · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url

Tools 13

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

assess-tradeoffsnetwork egress
consult-councilnetwork egress
debug-issuenetwork egress
design-architecturenetwork egress
get-logsreads sensitive data
plan-implementationnetwork egress
review-codenetwork egress
check-usageno sensitive capability
get-sessionno sensitive capability
get-thread-linkno sensitive capability

Show 3 more tools ↓

list-modelsno sensitive capability
list-sessionsno sensitive capability
set-thread-visibilityno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

Version	Score	Findings	Engine	Scanned
`v1.5.0` latest	A 94/100	7	1.9.0	2026-07-24

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

Markdown (GitHub README)

[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-roundtable-now/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-roundtable-now)

HTML

<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-roundtable-now"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-roundtable-now/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>

Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-roundtable-now/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan https://mcp.roundtable.now/mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

More in AI & Agents

Agent Source verified npm

@aauth/mcp-agent

Security scan results for the Agent MCP server.

AI & Agents Score 100/100 1 finding 121/wk Cap. Minimal

Agent Claim Source verified npm

@vk0/agent-claim-mcp

Security scan results for the Agent Claim MCP server.

AI & Agents Score 100/100 0 findings Cap. Minimal

Agent Comm Source verified npm

Security scan results for the Agent Comm MCP server.

AI & Agents Score 100/100 2 findings 113/wk Cap. Minimal

Agent Comm Source verified npm

@jerfowler/agent-comm-mcp-server

Security scan results for the Agent Comm MCP server.

AI & Agents Score 100/100 0 findings Cap. Minimal

Agent Mcp Manager Source verified npm

agent-mcp-manager

Security scan results for the Agent Mcp Manager MCP server.

AI & Agents Score 100/100 0 findings 1.2k/wk Cap. Minimal

Agent Mesh Source verified npm

@reaatech/agent-mesh-mcp-server

Security scan results for the Agent Mesh MCP server.

AI & Agents Score 100/100 0 findings 40/wk Cap. Minimal