Repl (AnEntrypoint) MCP Server
mcp-repl
npm
v2.5.7
Published by anentrypoint — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP REPL with code execution, semantic code search, and comprehensive ast-grep integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/arm64-vector-indexer.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/arm64-vector-indexer.js:30`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ', 'pnpm-lock.yaml', '.npmrc', '.yarnrc', '.pnpmrc' ]; const INDEX_FILE = 'code_index.json'; const VECTOR_INDEX_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/arm64-vector-indexer.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/js-vector-indexer.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/js-vector-indexer.js:52`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ', 'pnpm-lock.yaml', '.npmrc', '.yarnrc', '.pnpmrc' ]; const INDEX_FILE = 'code_index.json'; const VECTOR_INDEX_FI
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/js-vector-indexer.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/astgrep-project-config.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-project-config.js:224`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: message: "Avoid using eval() - security risk" rule: pattern: eval($EXPR) severity: error - i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-project-config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/astgrep-advanced-search.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-advanced-search.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'node:path'; /** * Advanced search capabilities for
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-advanced-search.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/astgrep-advanced.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-advanced.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'node:fs'; import * as path from 'node:path'; const exe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-advanced.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/astgrep-json-formats.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-json-formats.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'node:path'; /** * Enhanced JSON output control for
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-json-formats.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/astgrep-project-config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-project-config.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'node:path'; import { writeFileSync, readFileSync, exist
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-project-config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/astgrep-test-validation.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-test-validation.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'node:path'; import { writeFileSync, readFileSync, exist
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-test-validation.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/astgrep-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/astgrep-utils.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'node:path'; // Use CLI-only approach for maximum ARM6
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/astgrep-utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/process-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/process-executor.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createErrorResponse, createSuccessResponse, createTimeoutError, handle
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/process-executor.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-tools.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-tools.mjs:14`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ')}`; const td = await import(fileUrl); const getAllTools = td.getAllTools; const defined = Array.isArray(getAllTools
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-tools.mjs
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prune-tool-descriptions.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prune-tool-descriptions.mjs:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst defsModule = await import(defsUrl); const getAllTools = defsModule.getAllTools || defsModule.default?.getAllTool
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prune-tool-descriptions.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.5.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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