Remotetouch MCP Server

mcp-remotetouch npm v0.2.0 Source verified

Published by signal-slot — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust grade
B
85/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 85/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 15.4 = 85/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−15.4 Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code MTC-SRC-004 injection

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 3

high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (build/ssh-touch-session.js)MTC-SRC-004

In the server's implementation (`build/ssh-touch-session.js:19`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: exec(base64.b64decode

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/ssh-touch-session.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (build/ssh-touch-session.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`build/ssh-touch-session.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/ssh-touch-session.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (build/types.d.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`build/types.d.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/types.d.ts

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.0 latest B 85/100 3 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 85/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-remotetouch --online

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