Rate-My-Agent MCP Server

https://mcp.rate-my-agent.com/mcp Remote v1.1.1

Published by mcp.rate-my-agent.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

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Trust grade
F
47/100
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Trust
F · 47/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Live
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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F Why this grade threat 50 − adoption risk = 47/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 54.6 = 50. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−31.5 Compound tool-poisoning pattern MTC-INJ-POISON injection
−23.1 Secrecy directive ×2 MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1 injection

2. Client adoption risk — 50 − 3 = 47. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Grade capped: a critical finding is present → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

critical Compound tool-poisoning patternMTC-INJ-POISON

Multiple tool-poisoning signals co-occur in a single field (authority, secrecy), including a concealment / override / sensitive-target directive. Together they form an instruction aimed at the model — the canonical tool-poisoning shape, not ordinary documentation.

Evidence: Submit the completed lead. ONLY call after you have echoed the exact contact details and quiz answers back to the client and they picked the clearly-labeled "1. Confirm and Submit Request" option — se

Fix: Do not install this server; the metadata is engineered to manipulate the assistant.

Location: tool submit_lead · description

high Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1

Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the instructions of server. Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.

Evidence: DO NOT tell the user

Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.

high Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1

Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the description of tool "submit_lead". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.

Evidence: NEVER tell the user

Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.

Location: tool submit_lead · description

Tools 3

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

  • search_agentsingests untrusted input
  • get_lead_quizno sensitive capability
  • submit_leadno sensitive capability

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.1.1 latest F 47/100 3 1.10.0 2026-07-24

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: F · 47/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan https://mcp.rate-my-agent.com/mcp --online

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