ProductClank MCP Server
https://mcp.productclank.com/mcp
Remote
v0.9.0
Published by mcp.productclank.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Boost posts and launch community growth campaigns from your AI assistant. OAuth, credit-billed.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([create_campaign, find_opportunities, get_campaign_brief]) co-exist with external-action tools ([boost_post]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [create_campaign, find_opportunities, get_campaign_brief] → sinks [boost_post]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow create_campaign → boost_post
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "post_url" on "boost_post"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "boost_post" takes a URL/host parameter "post_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool boost_post · inputSchema.properties.post_url
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
boost_postnetwork egresscreate_campaigningests untrusted inputfind_opportunitiesingests untrusted inputget_campaign_briefingests untrusted inputadd_delegateno sensitive capabilitycheck_balanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_content_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_productno sensitive capabilitycredit_historyno sensitive capabilityfind_open_campaignsno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
generate_postsno sensitive capabilityget_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_activityno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_content_queueno sensitive capabilityget_content_workspaceno sensitive capabilityget_earningsno sensitive capabilityget_my_submissionsno sensitive capabilityget_postsno sensitive capabilityget_researchno sensitive capabilitylist_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_content_spacesno sensitive capabilitymanage_content_topicsno sensitive capabilityregenerate_repliesno sensitive capabilityreview_postsno sensitive capabilityrevise_content_draftno sensitive capabilityrun_researchno sensitive capabilitysearch_productsno sensitive capabilityset_campaign_scheduleno sensitive capabilitysetup_content_spaceno sensitive capabilitysubmit_campaign_workno sensitive capabilitysubmit_participationno sensitive capabilitysuggest_content_campaignno sensitive capabilityteach_content_voiceno sensitive capabilityupdate_campaignno sensitive capabilitywrite_content_candidatesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.0 latest |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v0.8.3 |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.5.1 |
A 97/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.3.0 |
A 97/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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