Printable MCP Server
mcp-printable
PyPI
v0.2.3
Published by aarongoldsmith — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for AI-driven 3D modeling and print validation (FDM-focused). Agent-agnostic; works with any MCP client (Claude Code, Goose, Cursor, Codex, ...).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "blender_execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "blender_execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool blender_execute_code
high Dynamic code execution in server code (evals/judges/procedural.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`evals/judges/procedural.py:47`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pace() try: exec(compile(policy.check_source, str(policy.path), "exec"), ns) except Exception as e:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server evals/judges/procedural.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (addon/handlers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`addon/handlers.py:276`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ngIO() try: exec(code, namespace) stdout = captured_out.getvalue() stderr = captured_err.get
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server addon/handlers.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (evals/adapters/goose.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`evals/adapters/goose.py:101`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: EL", "low") proc = subprocess.run( cmd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server evals/adapters/goose.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (evals/judges/procedural.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`evals/judges/procedural.py:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Pass | Fail | Skip We exec() that code in a controlled namespace where Pass/Fail/Skip and `re` are already bound, then
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server evals/judges/procedural.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scad_backend.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scad_backend.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ." ) return subprocess.run( [binary, *args], capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scad_backend.py
low Mutating tool "blender_execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "blender_execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool blender_execute_code
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
blender_execute_coderuns code / shellblender_booleanno sensitive capabilityblender_check_clearanceno sensitive capabilityblender_check_clearance_sweepno sensitive capabilityblender_check_intersectionno sensitive capabilityblender_check_retentionno sensitive capabilityblender_clear_sceneno sensitive capabilityblender_cross_sectionno sensitive capabilityblender_cross_section_galleryno sensitive capabilityblender_export_stlno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
blender_get_object_infono sensitive capabilityblender_get_scene_infono sensitive capabilityblender_get_screenshotno sensitive capabilityblender_import_stlno sensitive capabilityblender_rename_objectno sensitive capabilityblender_render_before_afterno sensitive capabilityblender_render_printability_heatmapno sensitive capabilityblender_render_tiledno sensitive capabilityblender_render_turntableno sensitive capabilityblender_render_with_dimensionsno sensitive capabilityblender_restore_checkpointno sensitive capabilityblender_save_blendno sensitive capabilityblender_validateno sensitive capabilityblender_version_infono sensitive capabilityscad_compileno sensitive capabilityscad_cross_sectionno sensitive capabilityscad_import_stlno sensitive capabilityscad_render_viewsno sensitive capabilityscad_validate_printabilityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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