Platform (Data-Everything) MCP Server
mcp-platform
PyPI
v1.3.1
Published by data-everything — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −22 | Hardcoded Slack token in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
Grade capped: 1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (mcp_platform/template/templates/demo/tests/test_name_override.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/template/templates/demo/tests/test_name_override.py:21`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dict(os.environ)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/demo/tests/test_name_override.py
high Hardcoded Slack token in server code (mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Slack token is hardcoded in `mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py:175`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Slack token: xoxb…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (mcp_platform/cli/cli.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/cli/cli.py:1116`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/cli/cli.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp_platform/cli/cli.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/cli/cli.py:1116`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/cli/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/backends/docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/backends/docker.py:262`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/backends/docker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/template/templates/bigquery/run_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/template/templates/bigquery/run_tests.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/bigquery/run_tests.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/tools/base_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/tools/base_probe.py:661`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/tools/base_probe.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/tools/docker_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/tools/docker_probe.py:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/tools/docker_probe.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/tools/kubernetes_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/tools/kubernetes_probe.py:652`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/tools/kubernetes_probe.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/build_docs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/build_docs.py:150`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build_docs.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/mcp_endpoint_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/mcp_endpoint_manager.py:372`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/mcp_endpoint_manager.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py:173`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: requests.post(
"https://slack.com/api/conversations.history"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
D 63/100 | 12 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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