Platform (Data-Everything) MCP Server
mcp-platform
PyPI
v1.3.1
Published by data-everything — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Platform: Production-ready Model Context Protocol server deployment and management platform
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded Slack token in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp_platform/cli/cli.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/cli/cli.py:1116`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "[bold]eval (env _MCPT_COMPLETE=fish_source python -m mcp_platform)[/bold]" ) else
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/cli/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/backends/docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/backends/docker.py:262`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: )) result = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 command, capture_output=capture_output, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/backends/docker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/template/templates/bigquery/run_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/template/templates/bigquery/run_tests.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", req], c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/bigquery/run_tests.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/tools/base_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/tools/base_probe.py:661`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/tools/base_probe.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/tools/docker_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/tools/docker_probe.py:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 2s, 4s subprocess.run( ["docker", "rm", "-f", container_name],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/tools/docker_probe.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_platform/tools/kubernetes_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_platform/tools/kubernetes_probe.py:652`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ut result = subprocess.run( kubectl_cmd, input=mcp_input, capture_output=True, text=True, ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/tools/kubernetes_probe.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py:173`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sts response = requests.post( "https://slack.com/api/conversations.history", headers={"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py
low Hardcoded Slack token in test/example/packaging (mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Slack token (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py:290`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Slack token: xoxb…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server mcp_platform/template/templates/slack/tests/test_slack_tools.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build_docs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build_docs.py:150`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ut result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, script_path], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build_docs.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/mcp_endpoint_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/mcp_endpoint_manager.py:372`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: {{ spawn }} = require('child_process'); async function connect{self.template_name.replace("-", "").title()}Server() {{
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/mcp_endpoint_manager.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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