Mcp Outlook (npm) MCP Server
mcp_outlook
npm
v1.0.14
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A Model Context Protocol server that integrates with Microsoft Outlook through Microsoft Graph API, allowing Claude and other LLMs to check calendar events, schedule new ones, read emails, and send messages.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/worker.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/worker.js:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0${url}`, { ...options, headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/worker.js
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
addAttendeesToCalendarEventno sensitive capabilitycreateCalendarEventno sensitive capabilitycreateDraftno sensitive capabilitydeleteCalendarEventno sensitive capabilitydeleteEmailno sensitive capabilityfindMeetingTimesno sensitive capabilitygetCalendarEventno sensitive capabilitygetEmailno sensitive capabilitygetPersonno sensitive capabilitygetScheduleno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
listCalendarEventsno sensitive capabilitylistEmailsno sensitive capabilitymarkEmailAsReadno sensitive capabilitymarkEmailAsUnreadno sensitive capabilitysearchPeopleno sensitive capabilitysendEmailno sensitive capabilityupdateCalendarEventno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.14 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp_outlook --onlineOther implementations of Mcp Outlook 8
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 9 side by side →
Servidor MCP oficial da Expert Integrado para Microsoft 365 (Outlook + Calendário + OneDrive). Autenticação via Device Code Flow com app pré-registrado — nenhuma configuração no Azure necessária.
MCP server for AI agents to parse and process Outlook email files
MCP Server to integrate with outlook
Outlook email MCP server for Claude — 19 tools for reading, sending, and managing email via Microsoft Graph API
MCP server for Microsoft Outlook integration to manage emails, calendar events, and contacts
MCP server for Outlook — enables AI assistants to access email, contacts, and calendars via win32com
More in Other
A Model Context Protocol server implementation for AdGuard Home that enables AI agents to query and manage DNS records, filtering rules and more
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
MCP server with Airtable integration
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.
Access SEC filings efficiently, save time and tokens, and get cited answers.
A smart [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server for [AniList](https://anilist.co) that gets your anime/manga taste - not just API calls.