Osascript MCP Server
mcp-osascript
npm
v1.1.1
Published by m0rvayne — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([app_menu, screenshot, file_open]) and tools that can send data out ([run_osascript, send_notification]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [app_menu, screenshot, file_open] → sinks [run_osascript, send_notification]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow app_menu → run_osascript
high Tool "run_osascript" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_osascript" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_osascript
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/executor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/index.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "run_osascript"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_osascript" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_osascript · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "run_osascript" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_osascript" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_osascript
low Unconstrained path parameter "menu_path" on "app_menu"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "app_menu" takes a path parameter "menu_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool app_menu · inputSchema.properties.menu_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "screenshot"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "screenshot" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool screenshot · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "file_open"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "file_open" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool file_open · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
app_menureads sensitive datafile_openreads sensitive datarun_osascriptruns code / shellscreenshotreads sensitive datasend_notificationnetwork egressapp_visibilityno sensitive capabilityget_browser_tabsno sensitive capabilityget_clipboardno sensitive capabilityget_displaysno sensitive capabilityget_frontmost_appno sensitive capabilitymanage_windowsno sensitive capabilityopen_appno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrun_shortcutno sensitive capabilityset_clipboardno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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