Openstack Ops MCP Server
mcp-openstack-ops
PyPI
v3.5.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
OpenStack operations automation MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/mcp_openstack_ops/functions.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_openstack_ops/functions.py:16`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ces from .services.core import ( get_service_status ) # Import connection utilities from .connection import reset_c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_openstack_ops/functions.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/mcp_openstack_ops/services/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_openstack_ops/services/__init__.py:9`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r management from .core import ( get_service_status ) # Compute service functions from .compute import ( get_in
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_openstack_ops/services/__init__.py
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_availability_zonesno sensitive capabilityget_floating_ip_poolsno sensitive capabilityget_floating_ipsno sensitive capabilityget_heat_stacksno sensitive capabilityget_hypervisor_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_image_detail_listno sensitive capabilityget_instanceno sensitive capabilityget_instance_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_instance_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_instances_by_statusno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
get_keypair_listno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_amphoraeno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_availability_zonesno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_flavorsno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_health_monitorsno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_l7_policiesno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_l7_rulesno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_listno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_listenersno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_pool_membersno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_poolsno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_providersno sensitive capabilityget_load_balancer_quotasno sensitive capabilityget_network_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_project_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_quotano sensitive capabilityget_resource_monitoringno sensitive capabilityget_role_assignmentsno sensitive capabilityget_routersno sensitive capabilityget_security_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_server_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_server_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_server_volumesno sensitive capabilityget_service_statusno sensitive capabilityget_usage_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_user_listno sensitive capabilityget_volume_listno sensitive capabilityget_volume_snapshotsno sensitive capabilityget_volume_typesno sensitive capabilitysearch_instancesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.5.2 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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