https://mcp.ohmyfin.ai/mcp
Remote
v3.1.0
Published by mcp.ohmyfin.ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Cross-border payment & banking intelligence for AI agents: SWIFT/BIC, IBAN, sanctions, FX, tracking.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 46.9 = 53. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −31.5 | Compound tool-poisoning pattern MTC-INJ-POISON | injection |
| −15.4 | Secrecy directive MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 53 − 0 = 53. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
✓ No adoption-risk deductions — minimal blast radius, verified enough, and fully inspected.
Grade capped: a critical finding is present → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Multiple tool-poisoning signals co-occur in a single field (authority, secrecy), including a concealment / override / sensitive-target directive. Together they form an instruction aimed at the model — the canonical tool-poisoning shape, not ordinary documentation.
Evidence: Track a SWIFT payment by UETR or reference number.
Basic SWIFT payment tracking enriched by data from certain banks in
the correspondent chain. Returns the overall payment status and,
when available,
Fix: Do not install this server; the metadata is engineered to manipulate the assistant.
Location: tool track_payment · description
Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the description of tool "track_payment". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: never tell the user
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool track_payment · description
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
bank_holidaysno sensitive capabilitybanks_using_correspondentno sensitive capabilitycompany_registriesno sensitive capabilitycompany_search_companyno sensitive capabilitycompany_search_personno sensitive capabilitycompany_search_resultno sensitive capabilitycountry_banking_rulesno sensitive capabilitycountry_export_controlsno sensitive capabilitycountry_payment_codesno sensitive capabilityeccn_lookupno sensitive capabilityexport_controls_screenno sensitive capabilityfederal_register_changesno sensitive capabilityfx_rateno sensitive capabilityfx_rate_historyno sensitive capabilityfx_timing_advisorno sensitive capabilityfx_volatilityno sensitive capabilitygoods_classifyno sensitive capabilitygpi_status_codesno sensitive capabilityhs_code_lookupno sensitive capabilityiban_validateno sensitive capabilityis_business_day_checkno sensitive capabilitymcp_registerno sensitive capabilitymcp_verifyno sensitive capabilitypayment_cutoff_timesno sensitive capabilitypayment_method_compareno sensitive capabilitysanctions_screenno sensitive capabilitysettlement_etano sensitive capabilityssi_lookupno sensitive capabilityswift_lookupno sensitive capabilityswift_message_referenceno sensitive capabilitytrack_paymentno sensitive capabilitytracking_historyno sensitive capabilitytransfer_costno sensitive capabilityvalue_dateno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.1.0 latest |
F 53/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan https://mcp.ohmyfin.ai/mcp --online
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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