Obsidian Extended MCP Server
mcp-obsidian-extended
npm
v1.1.1
Published by adder-factory — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Obsidian — 39 tools, 100% REST API coverage
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files_in_vault, list_files_in_dir, get_file_contents, batch_get_file_contents]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files_in_vault, list_files_in_dir, get_file_contents, batch_get_file_contents] → sinks [execute_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files_in_vault → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "get_file_contents"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "get_file_contents" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool get_file_contents · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 48
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_get_file_contentsreads sensitive datadelete_filewrites filesexecute_commandruns code / shellget_file_contentsreads sensitive datalist_files_in_dirreads sensitive datalist_files_in_vaultreads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesactive_fileno sensitive capabilityappend_active_fileno sensitive capabilityappend_contentno sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
append_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilityappend_periodic_note_for_dateno sensitive capabilitybatch_getno sensitive capabilitycommandsno sensitive capabilitycomplex_searchno sensitive capabilityconfigureno sensitive capabilitydataview_searchno sensitive capabilitydelete_active_fileno sensitive capabilitydelete_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_periodic_note_for_dateno sensitive capabilityget_active_fileno sensitive capabilityget_backlinksno sensitive capabilityget_note_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilityget_periodic_note_for_dateno sensitive capabilityget_recent_changesno sensitive capabilityget_recent_periodic_notesno sensitive capabilityget_server_statusno sensitive capabilityget_vault_structureno sensitive capabilitylist_commandsno sensitive capabilityopen_fileno sensitive capabilitypatch_active_fileno sensitive capabilitypatch_contentno sensitive capabilitypatch_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilitypatch_periodic_note_for_dateno sensitive capabilityperiodic_noteno sensitive capabilityput_active_fileno sensitive capabilityput_contentno sensitive capabilityput_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilityput_periodic_note_for_dateno sensitive capabilityrecentno sensitive capabilityrefresh_cacheno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_replaceno sensitive capabilitysimple_searchno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilityvaultno sensitive capabilityvault_analysisno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-obsidian-extended --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.