mcp-nordic
npm
v0.4.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Unified MCP server for Nordic data: company registries (DK/NO/FI), addresses, weather, and energy prices
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`src/servers/danish-weather.js:95`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com/v1/search?name=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&count=1&
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/servers/danish-weather.js
In the server's implementation (`src/servers/finnish-weather.js:79`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com/v1/search?name=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&count=1&
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/servers/finnish-weather.js
In the server's implementation (`src/servers/norwegian-companies.js:192`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://data.brreg.no/enhetsregisteret/api/enheter/${clean}/roller`, { headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/servers/norwegian-companies.js
In the server's implementation (`src/servers/norwegian-weather.js:55`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com/v1/search?name=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&count=1&
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/servers/norwegian-weather.js
In the server's implementation (`src/servers/swedish-weather.js:72`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com/v1/search?name=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&count=1&
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/servers/swedish-weather.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dk_address_searchno sensitive capabilitydk_cheapest_hoursno sensitive capabilitydk_co2_emissionsno sensitive capabilitydk_compare_weatherno sensitive capabilitydk_current_weatherno sensitive capabilitydk_cvr_lookupno sensitive capabilitydk_cvr_searchno sensitive capabilitydk_electricity_pricesno sensitive capabilitydk_energy_mixno sensitive capabilitydk_municipality_lookupno sensitive capabilitydk_nearby_addressesno sensitive capabilitydk_postal_code_lookupno sensitive capabilitydk_reverse_geocodeno sensitive capabilitydk_weather_forecastno sensitive capabilityfi_company_lookupno sensitive capabilityfi_compare_weatherno sensitive capabilityfi_current_weatherno sensitive capabilityfi_recent_registrationsno sensitive capabilityfi_search_by_industryno sensitive capabilityfi_search_companiesno sensitive capabilityfi_weather_forecastno sensitive capabilityno_address_searchno sensitive capabilityno_company_lookupno sensitive capabilityno_company_rolesno sensitive capabilityno_current_weatherno sensitive capabilityno_municipality_addressesno sensitive capabilityno_postal_code_lookupno sensitive capabilityno_reverse_geocodeno sensitive capabilityno_search_companiesno sensitive capabilityno_search_subunitsno sensitive capabilityno_weather_forecastno sensitive capabilityse_current_weatherno sensitive capabilityse_weather_forecastno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-nordic --online
MCP server for 2s.io — 575+ pay-per-call tools for AI agents — ground-truth data, AI gateway, and agent infra (storage, locks, queues, watchers). x402 USDC on Base/Solana, no API keys, upto usage billing, free trials.
ArXiv preprints + Google Scholar papers, with citation counts in one query.
Add MCP servers to your favorite coding agents with a single command.
Help agents automatically write and test stories for your UI components
Model Context Protocol server for AI-Archive platform - enables AI agents to discover, submit, and review research papers
MCP server for Semantic Scholar research workflows with stdio and Streamable HTTP transports.