Mysql Apifox MCP Server
mcp-mysql-apifox
npm
v1.3.4
Published by 327100395 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
- 不同项目连接不同 - 在 Mysql 数据库执行 SQL - 添加接口文档到 Apifox - 从 Apifox 下载所有API到本地文件 - 解析并执行 curl 命令 - 通过 FTP、FTPS 或 SFTP 操作项目关联的远程目录
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_apis → execute_mysql_only → run_curl. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_apis → execute_mysql_only → run_curl
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/darwin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/darwin.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "use strict"; var child_process_1 = require("child_process"); var path_1 = require("path"); module.exports = fun
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/darwin.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/linux.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/linux.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "use strict"; var child_process_1 = require("child_process"); var path_1 = require("path"); module.exports = fun
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/linux.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/win32.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/win32.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: splayBox = void 0; var child_process_1 = require("child_process"); var path_1 = require("path"); function displayBox(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/native-prompt/dist/lib/platforms/win32.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/terminal-input.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/terminal-input.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); class TerminalInput { constructor() { th
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/terminal-input.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/server.js:770`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await axios.post( `https://api.apifox.com/v1/projects/${projectId}/export-openapi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/terminal-input.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/terminal-input.js:177`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire('child_process').execSync(`which ${command}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); return true; } catch (err
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/terminal-input.js
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_apisingests untrusted inputexecute_mysql_onlyreads sensitive dataexecute_mysql_readonlyreads sensitive datarun_curlnetwork egressget_connection_statusno sensitive capabilityget_tables_infono sensitive capabilityimport_openapino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.4 latest |
B 83/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.2 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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