Mobile Interaction MCP Server
mcp-mobile-interaction
npm
v2.0.1
Source verified
Published by pablonortiz — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for interacting with Android and iOS devices/emulators — screenshots, taps, swipes, typing, UI inspection, and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/platforms/ui-daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/platforms/ui-daemon.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { run } from "../utils/exec.js"; const REMOTE_JAR = "/data/local/tmp/mcp-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/platforms/ui-daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from "child_process"; const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 15_000; const DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER = 10 * 1024 * 1024; //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/exec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/watchdog.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/watchdog.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; const CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 10_000; /** * How far up the process tree to watch. T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/watchdog.js
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
clear_app_datano sensitive capabilityclear_textno sensitive capabilitydismiss_dev_overlaysno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilitydouble_tapno sensitive capabilityfind_elementno sensitive capabilityget_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_clipboardno sensitive capabilityget_current_appno sensitive capabilityget_device_logsno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
get_screen_infono sensitive capabilityget_screen_stateno sensitive capabilityget_ui_treeno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilitykill_appno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylong_pressno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrecord_screenno sensitive capabilityrotate_deviceno sensitive capabilityrun_flowno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityset_appearanceno sensitive capabilityset_clipboardno sensitive capabilityset_locationno sensitive capabilityset_network_stateno sensitive capabilityset_permissionsno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilitytap_elementno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityuninstall_appno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_for_element_goneno sensitive capabilitywait_for_stableno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v1.4.0 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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