Memory Service — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-memory-service",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-memory-service"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-memory-service"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 71,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 21.7,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js:159`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js"
},
"evidence": "const resultsArray = eval(resultsMatch[1]); return resultsArray || []; } }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js",
"line": 159,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js:381`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js"
},
"evidence": "return eval(resultsMatch[1]) || []; } } return []; } ca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js",
"line": 381,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
],
"commandFile": "claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js",
"evalFile": "claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js",
"sameFile": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js:159`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js"
},
"evidence": "const resultsArray = eval(resultsMatch[1]); return resultsArray || []; } }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "claude-hooks/core/topic-change.js",
"line": 159,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js:381`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js"
},
"evidence": "return eval(resultsMatch[1]) || []; } } return []; } ca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "claude-hooks/utilities/dynamic-context-updater.js",
"line": 381,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-hooks/core/session-start.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/core/session-start.js:326`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/core/session-start.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); // Sanitize inputs to prevent injection via project names or queries",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/core/session-start.js",
"line": 326,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-hooks/install_hooks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/install_hooks.py:122`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/install_hooks.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run(['claude', '--help'], capture_output=True, text",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/install_hooks.py",
"line": 122,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); /** * Get recent commit history with detailed information */ async function",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-hooks/utilities/mcp-client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/utilities/mcp-client.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/utilities/mcp-client.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { EventEmitter } = require('events'); const fs = require('fs'); const pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/utilities/mcp-client.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (claude-hooks/utilities/project-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/utilities/project-detector.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/utilities/project-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); /** * Detect programming language from file extensions */ async function det",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/utilities/project-detector.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js:59`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "const filesOutput = execSync(`git show --name-only --pretty=\"\" ${commit.fullHash}`, { cwd: path.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "claude-hooks/utilities/git-analyzer.js",
"line": 59,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/mcp_memory_service/dependency_check.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_memory_service/dependency_check.py:102`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_memory_service/dependency_check.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(package.replace(\"-\", \"_\")) logger.debug(f\"{_sanitize_log_value(package)}",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/mcp_memory_service/dependency_check.py",
"line": 102,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/maintenance/update_graph_relationship_types.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/maintenance/update_graph_relationship_types.py:141`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/maintenance/update_graph_relationship_types.py"
},
"evidence": "tags = eval(row[\"tags\"]) except: tags = [] mem",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "scripts/maintenance/update_graph_relationship_types.py",
"line": 141,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/run_memory_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/run_memory_server.py:36`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/run_memory_server.py"
},
"evidence": "='utf-8') as f: exec(compile(f.read(), new_script, 'exec'), global_vars) else: print(f\"[ERROR] Could not fin",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "scripts/run_memory_server.py",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js:12`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js"
},
"evidence": ", args) { ${z} }`,h=new Function(Object.keys(P),z)(...Object.values(P)),z=`methodCaller<(${E.map(j=>j.name)}) => ${g",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (claude-hooks/scripts/ensure-server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`claude-hooks/scripts/ensure-server.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/scripts/ensure-server.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 500; const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 500; const POLL_TIMEOU",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/scripts/ensure-server.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (claude-hooks/tests/ensure-server.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`claude-hooks/tests/ensure-server.test.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/tests/ensure-server.test.js"
},
"evidence": "st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'scripts', 'ensure-server.js'); fun",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/tests/ensure-server.test.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js:477`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js"
},
"evidence": "'fs', 'path', 'https', 'child_process']; for (const module of requiredModules) { try {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js",
"line": 477,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (claude-hooks/tests/test-code-execution.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`claude-hooks/tests/test-code-execution.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/tests/test-code-execution.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); // ANSI Colors const COLORS = { RESET: '\\x1b[0m', GREEN: '\\x1b[32m',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/tests/test-code-execution.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (claude-hooks/tests/test-permission-request.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`claude-hooks/tests/test-permission-request.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/tests/test-permission-request.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require('child_process'); // ANSI Colors const COLORS = { RESET: '\\x1b[0m', GREEN: '\\x1b[32m',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "claude-hooks/tests/test-permission-request.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js:481`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js"
},
"evidence": "try { require(module); } catch (error) { return { success: false, error: `",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "claude-hooks/tests/integration-test.js",
"line": 481,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/service/service_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/service/service_utils.py:128`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/service/service_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(module) except ImportError: missing.append(module)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/service/service_utils.py",
"line": 128,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/utils/smithery_wrapper.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/utils/smithery_wrapper.py:50`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/utils/smithery_wrapper.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(package) print_info(f\"✓ {package} is available\") except ImportErr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/utils/smithery_wrapper.py",
"line": 50,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js:12`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js"
},
"evidence": "(e)},TA=async t=>(await import(t)).default,Zf=($z(),Tc(f2)).default,g2=async()=>{if(!zt)throw new Error(\"Failed to load",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "site/demo/assets/transformers.min.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "8a72479998ac48225c5ed19d8a438f2462f0f62f51a790ccd2603a7cafd4daa6",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 2,
"low": 12,
"info": 0
}
}
}